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This Article explores and examines the implications of the increasingly regulatory nature 
of U.S. copyright law. For many years, U.S. copyright law operated under a judicially-
administered, industry-neutral property rights regime. Congress set the scope of the 
property entitlement, leaving the courts to enforce the entitlement and the markets to 
organize the production of creative works in light of the entitlement structure. In recent 
years, however, Congress has shown an increasing willingness to intervene more directly 
in the structure of copyright markets. Congress’s most recent legislative efforts are far 
more complex and industry-specific, allocate rights and responsibilities in a far more 
detailed manner, and in some cases directly regulate technology and prices in the 
market. This Article examines and critically evaluates this trend. It first makes the 
descriptive claim that this kind of “regulatory copyright” has become increasingly the 
preferred, and indeed perhaps dominant, mode of copyright lawmaking. It then critically 
assesses both the strengths and weaknesses of this approach in the copyright law context, 
applying insights from the broader literature. Finally, it offers suggestions for both being 
more selective in deploying this mode of copyright lawmaking and improving the function 
of such lawmaking in cases where it is deployed. 
                                                                  
* Assistant Professor, (Associate Professor w/ Tenure, effective 9/1/04), Boston College 
Law School. L.L.M. 1999, Harvard; J.D. 1994, Columbia; B.A. 1989, Yale. Email: 
liujr@bc.edu. Please do not cite or reproduce without permission. Thanks to Julie Cohen, 
Stacey Dogan, Raymond Ku, Jacqueline Lipton, Jay Thomas, Alfred Yen, and the 
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 Copyright law has become very, very complicated. Every few years, it 
seems, Congress enacts another amendment to the copyright law, and 
each new amendment seems more complicated than the last. The first 
Copyright Act enacted in 1790 was a model of brevity, weighing in at a 
scant two or three pages. By 1909, the Act had expanded a bit, now 
closer to 20-odd pages, yet retaining a certain conceptual simplicity. 
Both of these Acts were limited primarily to defining the scope of the 
copyright entitlement. By 1976, however, Congress had significantly 
expanded the Act, reflecting dramatic changes in technology and the 
increasing complexity of modern copyright markets. The 1976 Act was 
more industry-specific and contained a number of extremely complex 
and detailed provisions. Subsequent amendments to the 1976 Act have 
added only more complexity. Today, the Copyright Act weighs in at 
more than 200, densely-packed pages, nearly a hundred times larger than 
the original act.1 
 This trend has not gone unnoticed. Indeed, the increasing complexity 
of the Copyright Act has become the subject of bemused humor among 
copyright scholars and others. Comparisons to the tax code are becoming 
increasingly frequent.2 Teaching the subject has increasingly required 
less explication of broad principles in case law and more close reading of 
detailed statutory provisions. Many commentators have become 
increasingly concerned that the complexity of the code is making it more 
difficult for individuals to understand and comply with its provisions.3 
Others have thrown up their hands at the complexity of certain, very 
detailed, provisions. 
 Despite widespread recognition of the increasing complexity of U.S. 
copyright law, relatively little has been written comprehensively 
addressing the broader implications of this change in our copyright laws. 
Most of the existing literature has focused on isolated aspects of this 
increased complexity. Jessica Litman, for example, has written about 
                                                                  
1 See infra Appendix A for a chart, showing the dramatic increase in the size of U.S. 
copyright law over time. 
2 See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers In Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 
1575, 1638 (2003); Shubha Ghosh, The Merits Of Ownership; Or, How I Learned To 
Stop Worrying And Love Intellectual Property, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 453 (2002) (citing 
unpublished speech by Professor Alfred Yen); Jonathan Zittrain, “The Copyright Cage,” 
LEGAL AFFAIRS (Jul./Aug. 2003) (comparing copyright scholars’ attitudes towards the 
Copyright Act to the “benign contempt” with which tax scholars regard the tax code). 
3 Jessica Litman, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 25, 29 (2001); Jessica Litman, Revising Copyright 
Law for the Information Age, 75 OR. L. REV. 19, 22-23 (1996). 
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how the complexity of the copyright act makes it difficult for individuals 
to abide by its requirements.4 Robert Merges has analyzed how some of 
this complexity is a response to changing technology.5 Peter Menell has 
suggested that the complexity may result in part from the political 
landscape surrounding copyright issues.6 Still others have focused on the 
complexity of certain provisions7 or commented in passing on the 
increasing complexity of copyright law as a whole.8 Few commentators, 
however, have focused sustained critical attention on the changing 
character of copyright regulation as a whole and the broader implications 
of this change. 
 This Article is an attempt to focus some critical light on the 
increasingly regulatory nature of U.S. copyright law. In this Article, I 
first make the descriptive claim that U.S. copyright law is undergoing a 
shift in the way in which it seeks to effectuate its goal of promoting 
progress through providing incentives for creation.9 For many years, U.S. 
copyright law was based largely on a judicially-administered, industry-
neutral property rights regime. Congress was responsible for setting the 
                                                                  
4 See, e.g., Litman, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT, supra note 3; Jessica Litman, Copyright 
Legislation and Technological Change, 69 OR. L. REV. 275 (1989). 
5 See Robert Merges, One Hundred Years Of Solicitude: Intellectual Property Law: 
1900-2000, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2187 (2000); Robert P. Merges, Intellectual Property Rights 
And The New Institutional Economics, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1857 (2000). See also William 
Fisher III, PROMISES TO KEEP: TECHNOLOGY, LAW, AND THE FUTURE OF ENTERTAINMENT 
(forthcoming 2004). 
6 See Peter Menell, Envisioning Copyright Law's Digital Future, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 
63 (2002-03). 
7 See Lydia Pallas Loren, Untangling The Web Of Music Copyrights, 53 CASE W. RES. L. 
REV. 673 (2003); David Nimmer, Ignoring The Public, Part I: On The Absurd 
Complexity Of The Digital Audio Transmission Right, 7 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 189 (2000).  
See also R. Anthony Reese, Copyright and Internet Music Transmissions: Existing Law, 
Major Controversies, Possible Solutions, 55 U. MIAMI L. REV. 237 (2001). 
8 See Craig Joyce, et al., COPYRIGHT LAW 28 (5th ed. 2001); David Nimmer, 
Appreciating Legislative History The Sweet And Sour Spots Of The DMCA’s 
Commentary, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 909 (2002) (“It must be admitted that, of late, the 
Copyright Act has attracted technically complex amendments even more often than once 
a year.”); Michael W. Carroll, Disruptive Technology And Common Law Lawmaking: A 
Brief Analysis Of A&M Records, Inc. V. Napster, Inc., 9 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 5 
(2000) (“In the Twentieth Century, the story of copyright law has been one featuring a 
series of business-to-business arrangements worked out among industry representatives 
and enacted by Congress, with a little fine-tuning along the way. As a result, copyright 
law has become quite complex and much of the Copyright Act of 1976 ("Copyright Act") 
reads like a very finely detailed contract.”); I. Trotter Hardy, Not So Different: Tangible, 
Intangible, Digital, And Analog Works And Their Comparison For Copyright Purposes, 
26 U. DAYTON L. REV. 211 (2001); F. Gregory Lastowka, Free Access And The Future Of 
Copyright, 27 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 293 (2001); Kenneth D. Crews, Looking 
Ahead And Shaping The Future: Provoking Change In Copyright Law, 49 J. COPYRIGHT 
SOC'Y U.S.A. 549 (2001). 
9 See infra Part I.  
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property entitlement. The courts were responsible for defining and 
enforcing the entitlement. And the markets and private institutions were 
responsible for organizing the production of creative works in light of the 
property rights structure. The Copyright Office’s role was primarily 
ministerial, registering and tracking ownership of copyrighted works.10 
 In recent years, however, Congress has been much more willing to 
intervene in the structure of copyright markets.11 The 1976 Act departed 
from the pure property-rights view by introducing detailed, industry-
specific exemptions and several complex compulsory licenses for certain 
industries. The Librarian of Congress was, for the first time, charged not 
only with registering copyrights, but also setting licensing rates, albeit in 
only a few industries. Since the 1976 Act, amendments to the act have 
become increasingly more detailed and industry-specific, relying more 
on compulsory licenses and, in some cases, mandating adoption of 
certain technologies and banning others. The Librarian of Congress’s 
duties have similarly expanded beyond mere registration, encompassing 
not only rate-making but also substantive rulemaking. Recently proposed 
legislation, as well as academic proposals for significantly revamping the 
copyright system, also exhibit similar qualities. The trend is such that 
this mode of “regulatory copyright”12 is now arguably the dominant 
mode of copyright lawmaking. 
 Like the earlier, property-rights model of copyright, this regulatory 
approach to copyright has strengths and weaknesses.13 Although the 
trade-offs between a judicially-administered property-rights regime 
                                                                  
10 Note that I use the descriptive term “property” in the above sense, to denote a rather 
broad entitlement enforceable through injunctive relief. See Robert Cooter & Thomas 
Ulen, LAW AND ECONOMICS 125 (2d ed. 1997); Guido Calabresi & Douglas Melamed, 
Property Rules, Liability Rules, And Inalienability: One View Of The Cathedral, 85 Harv. 
L. Rev. 1089 (1972). The discussion of “property” in this Article thus focuses primarily 
on the nature of the copyright entitlement, and not on the specific makeup of the 
entitlement (i.e. whether it should be more expansive or more limited). For a discussion 
about the rhetorical uses (and abuses) of the term “property” in the intellectual property 
context, see, e.g., Mark Lemley, Romantic Authorship and the Rhetoric of Property, 
Shamans, Software, and Spleens: Law and the Construction of the Information Society, 
75 TEX. L. REV. 873 (1997); Dan Burk, The Trouble with Trespass, 4 J. SM. & EMERG. 
BUS. L. 27 (2000); Michael Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property Through A Property 
Paradigm (forthcoming 2004) (do not cite w/out permission); Adam Mosoff, Is 
Copyright Property?: A Comment on Richard Epstein’s Liberty vs. Property 
(forthcoming 2004). 
11 See infra Part II. 
12 The Article defines this term in more detail in Part II, infra. Other commentators have 
used the term to describe these changes in copyright law. See, e.g., Menell, Envisioning, 
supra note 6, at 195 (briefly noting the shift from property rights to regulatory regime); 
Fisher, supra note 5, at Chapter 5 (sketching out what copyright might look like if treated 
like a regulated industry); Reza Dibadj, Regulatory Givings And The Anticommons, 64 
OHIO ST. L.J. 1041 (2003) (analyzing copyright as a “regulatory giving”).  
13 See infra Part III. 
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versus a more interventionist regulatory regime have been widely 
recognized in other areas of the law, relatively little attention has been 
paid to the trade-off in the copyright context. The great strength of the 
regulatory approach in copyright is that it permits far more detailed and 
precise tailoring of rights and responsibilities in response to specific 
industry structures. The approach can thus be used to respond to market 
failures that might exist under a pure property rights approach. It also 
provides parties with more specificity and clarity. Finally, it often 
reflects negotiated agreements between the regulated parties, and is thus 
politically feasible.  
 At the same time, the regulatory approach, as currently implemented 
in the copyright context, suffers from a number of weaknesses.14 The 
regulatory approach is more complex and therefore more costly to 
administer. The complexity makes copyright law less coherent and less 
transparent. This increases both the incentive and opportunities for rent-
seeking by the affected industries. Furthermore, unlike other complex 
areas of federal law, agency involvement in substantive copyright 
policymaking has been relatively limited, for various historical reasons. 
As currently implemented, the regulatory approach in copyright lacks 
flexibility, and thus presents the risk of locking in existing industry 
structures. The current approach also makes insufficient use of expertise 
and empirical data in the policymaking process.  
 A number of suggestions can be gleaned from this critical assessment 
of regulatory copyright.15 First, the analysis offers some guidance 
regarding when a regulatory approach may be preferable to a property-
rights approach in the copyright context, and vice versa. For example, 
where there is a clear case of market failure, where there is good data, 
where the main participants in that industry are easily-identifiable and 
well-represented, a regulatory approach may have significant advantages. 
By contrast, where the case for market failure is not so clear, where there 
is significant uncertainty about technology and/or the future structure of 
the market, and where there are new entrants, a property-based model 
may be preferable. This suggests that recent attempts to apply a 
regulatory model to digital copyright issues may be premature. 
 Second, this assessment suggests ways of improving the function of 
regulatory copyright in those cases where it is deployed.16 Express 
recognition of the regulatory nature of modern copyright law suggests 
perhaps a greater role on the part of the Copyright Office, as the 
administrative body best placed to set copyright policy in response to the 
changing technological and market environment. In order to play this 
                                                                  
14 See id. 
15 See infra Part IV. 
16 See id. 
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role, changes would need to be made to the structure and responsibilities 
of the Copyright Office. In particular, greater technical and economic 
expertise would be essential. Furthermore, the assessment suggests that 
there would need to be ways to ensure sufficient public input into the 
regulatory process. Although delegating increased authority to the 
Copyright Office is not without its downsides, such an approach would 
be superior to the current approach, in which Congress passes inflexible, 
technology-specific legislation without adequate technical expertise. 
 Part I of this Article begins by examining the property-rights approach 
of the pre-1976 copyright acts. It describes the earlier acts and identifies 
a number of common features in both the substantive law and how that 
law was implemented. Part II outlines the competing “regulatory 
copyright” approach that began to emerge in the 1976 Act and has been 
increasingly dominant since then. This Part identifies the characteristics 
of this new approach. Part III offers some tentative explanations for why 
the regulatory approach has become increasingly dominant. It then 
critically assesses both the strengths and weaknesses of this model as 
compared to the earlier model, drawing from familiar insights from other 
areas of the law. Part IV then focuses on some of the implications of the 
analysis. In particular, it proposes guidelines for determining when a 
regulatory approach may be more appropriate. Finally, it offers 
suggestions for improving the function of the regulatory approach in 
those areas where it is deployed. 
 Ultimately, the primary goal of this Article is to identify and focus 
attention upon a largely-unexamined, yet powerful, trend in U.S. 
copyright law. A further goal is to suggest ways in which we can be 
more conscious about the regulatory process and the underlying 
institutional structure that administers it, in order to increase the chance 
that effective copyright policies will result. If this Article succeeds in 
changing the way we view copyright law and starting a discussion about 
this change, that will be sufficient. If it can propose ways of improving 
copyright law at the margin, so much the better. 
 
I.  THE PROPERTY RIGHTS MODEL 
 
 This Part of the Article analyzes the model that characterized the first 
150 years of U.S. copyright law. As this Part will show, for much of U.S. 
history, U.S. copyright law has limited itself to defining a relatively 
simple, industry-neutral property entitlement. The courts subsequently 
enforced and elaborated upon the entitlement in a common-law-like 
manner. The market and private institutions were then primarily 
responsible for organizing the production of creative works in light of the 
 
8 REGULATORY COPYRIGHT  April 26, 2004 
entitlement structure. The Copyright Office’s role was primarily 
ministerial and involved little or no substantive policymaking role. After 
providing support for this descriptive claim, this Part discusses a number 
of characteristics of this property-rights approach to copyright law. 
 
A. THE EARLY COPYRIGHT ACTS 
 
1. 1790 Act 
 
 The very first Copyright Act was a model of brevity and simplicity. 
Enacted in 1790, the Act contained seven short sections defining the 
scope of the copyright entitlement.17 The Act was limited to maps, 
charts, and books, and gave authors of these works an exclusive right to 
print, reprint, publish, and sell them. In order to get the benefit of the 
exclusive right, the author had to record title in the work at the clerk’s 
office of the district court where the author resided. The author also had 
to deposit a copy with the Secretary of State. The Act indicated that the 
exclusive right lasted for 14 years and could be renewed for an additional 
14 years by re-recording the work. The Act also spelled out the penalties 
that would apply to any person who violated the exclusive right. And that 
was basically it. 
 The 1790 Act thus established a rather simple property-rights regime 
as a way of addressing the public goods problem presented by maps, 
charts and books.18 The exclusive right enabled authors of maps, charts, 
and books to exclude direct imitators and recoup their initial investment 
in creative effort. The entitlement created by the Act was substantively 
quite straightforward, covering a specific set of works and barring a 
specific set of actions. The courts were responsible for enforcing the 
entitlement. The administrative role was handled by the local district 
courts, and was limited to recording the property interest in much the 
same way that real property interests might be recorded at a registry of 
deeds. 
  
2. 1790 – 1909 
 
 From 1790 to 1909, the Copyright Act was amended in a number of 
ways, although it retained the same basic structure. First, the subject 
matter of copyright was gradually extended beyond maps, charts, and 
books, to include prints,19 musical compositions,20 photographs,21 
                                                                  
17 Act of May, 31 1790, 1st Cong., 2d Sess., 1 STAT. 124. 
18 See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 
355 (1967). 
19 Act of April 29, 1802, 7th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 STAT. 171. 
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paintings, drawings, chromolithographs, statues, and works of fine art.22 
Exclusive rights were similarly expanded to include a public 
performance right for dramatic23 and musical24 compositions. The 
original term of copyright protection was extended as well, from 14 to 28 
years. Congress also beefed up the formalities, introducing the notice 
requirement25 and deposit with the Library of Congress.26 During this 
period, Congress also established the Copyright Office and charged it 
with the administrative aspects of the Copyright Act, which at this point 
were limited largely to registering copyrights, renewals, and transfers. 
 All of these changes were incremental, and none altered the basic 
structure of the Act. Despite expansions in subject matter, rights, and 
term, the copyright act retained its central focus on defining a relatively 
industry-neutral property entitlement. And although the Copyright Office 
was established to administer the act, its role was largely a record-
keeping role, again much akin to the role played by a local registry of 
deeds or other such agency. 
 
3. 1909 Act 
 
 These incremental changes eventually led to the substantial revision 
of the copyright act in 1909. The 1909 Act was substantially more 
complex than its predecessors and initially contained approximately 64 
sections.27 The subject matter of copyright expanded to include, not just a 
limited listing of copyrighted works, but “all the writings” of an author.28 
The exclusive rights similarly expanded to include, not only the rights to 
“print, reprint, publish, copy, and vend” the copyrighted work, but also 
the rights to create certain derivative works and publicly perform certain 
works.29 The renewal term was also extended by an additional 14 years, 
so that the maximum possible term was now 56 years.30 Copyright 
protection was, moreover, measured not from the date of the filing of 
title, but from the date of first publication with notice.31 
 Despite increasing in complexity, the 1909 Act also retained the 
basic property-rights structure of the earlier Acts. Many of the additional 
                                                                                                                                                   
20 Act of February 3, 1831, 21st Cong., 2d Sess., 4 STAT. 436. 
21 Act of March 3, 1865, 38th Cong., 2d Sess., 13 STAT. 540. 
22 Act of July 8, 1870, 41st Cong., 2d Sess., 16 STAT. 198. 
23 Act of August 18, 1856, 34th Cong., 1st Sess., 11 STAT. 138. 
24 Act of January 6, 1897, 44th Cong., 2d Sess., 29 STAT. 481. 
25 Act of April 29, 1802, 7th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 STAT. 171. 
26 Act of August 10, 1846, 29th Cong., 1st Sess., 9 STAT. 106. 
27 Act of March 4, 1909, 60th Cong., 2d Sess., 35 STAT. 1075. 
28 Id. § 4.  These writings were classified, for purposes of registration, in § 5. 
29 Id. § 1(a). 
30 Id. § 23. 
31 Id. 
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provisions merely elaborated upon and gave greater detail to the basic 
entitlement structure. For example, many of the additional provisions 
gave more detailed instructions about the notice, deposit, and registration 
requirements and procedures.32 Others provided extensive detail about 
the substantive and procedural requirements for infringement actions.33 
Still others provided additional guidance about initial ownership, 
assignment, and transfers of the entitlement, along with the attendant 
recording requirements.34 Again, all of these were consistent with the 
basic property-rights structure. 
 The Act also spelled out, in greater detail, the responsibilities of the 
Copyright Office. The Act directed the Librarian of Congress to appoint 
a Register and Assistant Register of copyrights.35 The Register was 
charged with registering copyrights, accepting deposits of copies of 
works, collecting copyright fees, keeping and making publicly available 
various records and indices relating to registration, and reporting 
annually to the Librarian of Congress regarding these activities.36 The 
Register was also given the power to issue rules and regulations 
regarding the registration process.37 Although the 1909 Act spelled out 
the administrative role of the Copyright Office in far more detail, its role 
remained focused on keeping and maintaining records regarding 
ownership of the basic copyright entitlement. Thus, the entire structure of 
the 1909 Act remained significantly focused upon defining a basic 
property entitlement. 
 The 1909 Act did, however, contain a few notable departures from 
the strict, industry-neutral property-rights model. First, the 1909 Act was 
more industry-specific than previous acts. The exclusive rights varied 
somewhat according to the type of work.38 Moreover, certain exceptions 
and damage limitations were industry or work-specific. For example, the 
act exempted certain non-profit public performances of musical works by 
“public schools, church choirs, or vocal societies.” 39 It also specified 
different damages based on the type of work. Although these provisions 
represented some tailoring of the act to respond to certain markets, they 
constituted very minor exceptions to the broader property-rights structure 
set up by the 1909 Act. 
                                                                  
32 Id. §§ 12-13, 18-22. 
33 Id. §§ 25-40. 
34 Id. §§ 6-8, 41-46, 62 (work for hire). 
35 Id. § 48. 
36 Id. § 49. 
37 Id. § 53. 
38 Id. § 1. See also classification list in § 5. 
39 Id. at §25(b) (damage for specific types of works); 28 (exemption for certain non-profit 
public performances by “public schools, church choirs, or vocal societies”). 
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 More significantly, the 1909 Act contained the first, industry-specific 
compulsory license scheme, the so-called “mechanical license.”40 This 
license was a direct response to the new technology of player-piano rolls, 
which posed a significant threat to the established sheet music industry. 
Prior to the 1909 Act, the Supreme Court in White-Smith v. Apollo41 had 
held that piano-rolls were not infringing “copies” of the musical work, 
because the piano-rolls were not generally intelligible by humans. The 
1909 Act legislatively overruled that decision, but at the same time, 
enacted a compulsory license that permitted piano roll manufacturers to 
create such rolls upon payment of a statutorily set fee of two cents per 
copy to the original copyright owner of the musical work.42 The 
copyright owner could demand a report of such use, due on the 20th of 
each month, with the royalty payment due on the 20th of the following 
month.43 Payment of the royalty shielded the piano-roll manufacturer 
from further copyright liability. 
 The mechanical license is significant because, unlike some of the 
minor industry-specific parts of the act mentioned above, the license 
represented a significant departure from the property-rights model. 
Instead of granting a property entitlement to the original musical work 
owner and forcing the piano-roll manufacturers to bargain for a license, 
Congress itself set the terms of the license and enacted it into the statute. 
The statute established the price for the license (originally two cents per 
copy), the terms of the license, the reporting procedures, and the 
penalties for failure to comply with the terms. The statute thus singled 
out a specific industry for special treatment and intervened in that 
market. The impetus for this special treatment was a desire to ensure 
robust competition in the burgeoning piano-roll industry, in light of the 
then-dominance of one particular piano-roll company.44 
 At the end of the day, however, this departure from the property-
rights focus of the copyright act was limited to a small slice of the 
copyright markets. The 1909 Act retained its overall focus on 
establishing and detailing the contours of the basic property entitlement. 
 
4. 1976 Act 
 
 As we will see later in this Article, the next major revision of the 
copyright act in 1976 represented a more significant departure from the 
property-rights model. The 1976 revision of the  Copyright Act was a 
                                                                  
40 Id. § 1(e). 
41 209 U.S. 1 (1909). 
42 Act of March 4, 1909, 60th Cong., 2d Sess., 35 STAT. 1075, § 1(e). 
43 Id. 
44 See Loren, supra note 7, at 681; Paul Goldstein, COPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY: THE LAW AND 
LORE OF COPYRIGHT FROM GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL JUKEBOX 65-67 (1994). 
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substantial undertaking by any measure. As early as 1955, Congress 
authorized the Copyright Office to begin studying the possibility of 
substantially revising the act in response to dramatic changes in the 
copyright industries.45 The Copyright Office submitted a detailed report 
to Congress in 1961. After a number of drafts, the first revision bill was 
introduced in 1964, followed by extensive hearings. Bills were passed by 
the House in 1967 and 1976 and by the Senate in 1974 and 1976. 
Differences in the versions were resolved, and the new act was signed in 
1976.46 The process of revision thus took more than 20 years. Much of 
the delay resulted from the complexity of the subject matter (in light of 
new industries and technologies) and from the need to balance the 
interests of many competing industry players.47 
 The resulting statute was significantly more complex and detailed 
than previous copyright acts. The 1976 Act contained several dozen, 
extremely detailed sections and spanned several hundred pages. As will 
be discussed below, a number of these provisions represented rather 
significant departures from the property-rights model that had, up until 
this time, been dominant. 
 Before discussing these departures, however, it is worth noting that 
the 1976 Act nevertheless retained, at its core, many aspects of the 
property-rights model. The 1976 Act, like the previous acts, defined a 
basic property entitlement. The subject matter of copyright was broadly 
consistent with the 1909 Act, covering all “original works of authorship 
fixed in a tangible medium of expression.”48 The act also listed the basic 
rights that entitlement owners could assert, and these too were broadly 
similar to (though slightly more expansive than) the rights under the 
1909 Act.49 Calculation of the term of protection was changed from the 
date of publication to the life of the author plus 50 years. Many of the 
formalities under the previous acts were retained, though weakened 
somewhat. The Copyright Office retained its primary role of registering 
and keeping records relating to copyrights.50 
 The 1976 Act also expressly recognized the role that courts had been 
playing in helping to define the contours of the property entitlement. The 
Act did so by codifying the fair use defense,51 which the courts had 
independently developed prior to the 1976 Act. Although the earlier 
copyright acts expressly mentioned no such defense, courts interpreting 
                                                                  
45 See generally William Patry, LATMAN’S THE COPYRIGHT LAW 12 (6th ed. 1986). 
46 Id. 
47 See Jessica Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L. 
REV. 857 (1987). 
48 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). 
49 17 U.S.C. § 106. 
50 17 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq.  
51 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
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these acts created a defense for certain limited acts of copying.52 The 
1976 Act attempted to codify the case law by identifying the factors that 
courts had been considering, while leaving room for the courts to 
continue to develop the defense in a case-by-case manner.53 The 1976 
Act thus expressly recognized the role that courts had been playing in 
tailoring the scope of the property entitlement in a common-law-like 
manner in response to specific factual situations. This, too, was broadly 
consistent with a primary focus on defining a property entitlement. 
 Thus in the end, the 1976 Act retained, at its core, the same basic 
property-rights model underlying the earlier acts. As we will later see, 
however, the Act also introduced a number of very significant departures 





 The property-rights model underlying the early copyright acts has a 
number of important features from a regulatory and institutional point of 
view. First, the model is substantively rather simple. That is, the 
substantive law of copyright, at least as articulated in the statute, is 
relatively straightforward. Under this model, copyright law defines a 
basic property entitlement. It sets forth the subject matter covered by 
copyright (whether a limited list of types of works, or more broadly all 
writings). It details the basic requirements for protection (whether 
registration, publication, or fixation). It sets forth the exclusive rights 
given to copyright owners (whether merely to prevent copying, or also 
public performances and creation of derivative works). And it sets forth 
the penalties for violation of these rights. Thus, the underlying 
entitlement is relatively straightforward and easy to understand. 
 Second, and relatedly, the property-rights model is generally industry 
and technology neutral. Copyright law under this model defines a 
property entitlement that applies equally to all of the works that are 
subject to copyright protection. It makes few distinctions between books, 
music, sculpture, or other types of works. All works are subject to the 
same requirements for protection. All are given broadly (though not 
entirely) the same set of exclusive rights.54 And all are protected for the 
                                                                  
52 The earliest articulation of the fair use defense in U.S. law is generally considered to be 
Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (Story, J.). 
53 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
54 The main exception to this is the lack of a general public performance right for sound 
recordings. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(4). 
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same length of time, this despite potentially significant differences in the 
nature of the particular markets.55 
 Third, this model relies upon the courts for implementation and 
further articulation of the property entitlement. The substantive 
simplicity of the statute does not necessarily mean that the substantive 
law of copyright is simple. Instead, it means that the courts are charged 
with dealing with any complexities in the application of the statute. The 
important feature, however, is that these complexities are not detailed in 
the code, but are developed in a case-by-case manner according to more 
general principles, quite akin to common law development.56 Thus the 
courts are charged with developing tests and principles for separating 
protectible expression from unprotectible ideas,57 for determining when 
infringement occurs,58 and for determining when liability should be 
excused under fair use.59 A good deal of substantive complexity can be 
found in the case law. At the same time, the case-by-case nature of 
common-law adjudication places a practical limit on the extent of this 
substantive complexity. 
 Fourth, this model relies upon private institutions and private 
ordering to organize the production of creative works. Under this model, 
copyright law sets the scope of the entitlement and is relatively agnostic 
about the details and structure of the resulting market. The distribution of 
rights and responsibilities among various market players is not 
determined by the statute. The terms of the licensing arrangements 
(including rates and division of rights) are similarly left to the market.60 
The basic idea is that copyright sets the entitlement to solve the public 
goods problem and then largely gets out of the way. The assumption is 
                                                                  
55 See Ralph Brown & Robert Denicola, CASES ON COPYRIGHT, UNFAIR COMPETITION, 
AND RELATED TOPICS BEARING ON THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY, MUSICAL, AND 
ARTISTIC WORKS 487 (7th ed. 1998) (suggesting possibility of varying terms depending 
on nature of the work). 
56 See Pierre N. Leval, An Assembly Of Idiots?, 34 CONN. L. REV. 1049, 1062 (2002) 
(describing the “highly successful partnership” between congress and the courts in the 
development and articulation of copyright law). 
57 See, e.g., Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1880); Feist Publications v. Rural Telephone 
Serv., 499 U.S. 340 (1991); Nichols v. Universal Pictures, 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1931) 
(Hand, J.).  
58 See, e.g., Steinberg v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 663 F. Supp. 709 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); 
Computer Assoc. v. Altai, 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992) (developing “abstraction, 
filtration, comparison” test).  
59 See, e.g., Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (D. Mass. 1841) (Story, J.); Campbell v. 
Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569 (1994); Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation Enterp., 
471 U.S. 539 (1985). 
60 Collective rights organizations may play a role, under this vision, in reducing potential 
transactions costs. See Robert Merges, Contracting Into Liability Rules: Intellectual 
Property Rights and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1293 (1996). 
Note also the role of antitrust law in regulating these organizations. 
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that, once the entitlement is set, private ordering will ensure that the 
entitlement is efficiently allocated.61 
 Fifth and finally, under this model the administrative role of the 
Copyright Office is relatively limited. The Copyright Office is charged 
primarily with record-keeping.62 It registers works, registers renewals 
and transfers, accepts deposits, charges fees, and maintains records. Its 
policymaking power is limited to regulations involving the mechanics of 
the above activities.63 And although in limited circumstances it may 
refuse to register a work for failure of subject matter,64 these rejections 
comprise a relatively limited part of the Copyright Office’s duties. Thus, 
the role here is again akin to the administrative role played by registries 
of deeds in real property. 
 The virtues of a relatively simple property rights structure have been 
extensively discussed in the broader literature on property entitlements 
more generally, and this model of copyright law shares these virtues.65 
Clear and simple property entitlements are easier to understand. Such 
entitlements make it easier for individuals to avoid infringement. They 
also reduce both the likelihood and expense of disagreements over 
entitlement scope. Simpler entitlement structures also reduce the costs of 
bargaining and facilitate market transactions by providing accurate 
information about rights. 
 A simple property entitlement may also do a better job of efficiently 
allocating resources, particularly if the entitlement is difficult to value.66 
Where a particular entitlement is difficult to value, enforcing it via a 
property rule (as opposed to a liability rule) forces the parties in the 
market to bargain. Because the parties can more accurately value 
entitlements such as intellectual property rights, the prices they reach in 
the market will better reflect the value of these entitlements. By contrast, 
                                                                  
61 See, e.g., Goldstein, Copyright’s Highway, supra note 44; Robert Merges, Contracting 
Into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 
CALIF. L. REV. 1293 (1996); Robert Merges, The End of Friction?  Property Rights and 
Contract in the Newtonian World of On-Line Commerce, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 115 
(1997); see generally R.H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & 
ECON. 1, 18 (1959) (“the allocation of resources should be determined by the forces of the 
market rather than as a result of government decisions”). 
62 See 1909 Act, §§ 201 et seq. 
63 See 1909 Act, § 207; 37 C.F.R. §§ 201 et seq. (detailing procedures for filings, etc.). 
64 See, e.g., Atari Games v. Oman, 888 F.2d 878 (D.C. Cir. 1989); 37 C.F.R. § 202.1. 
(listing material not subject to copyright). 
65 See Robert Cooter & Thomas Ulen, LAW AND ECONOMICS 125 (2d ed. 1997); Mitchell 
Polinsky, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS (2d ed. 1989); Merges, 
Contracting, supra note 61; Carol Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. 
REV. 577 (1988).  But see Dan Burk, Muddy Rules for Cyberspace, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 
121 (1999). 
66 See Cooter & Ulen, LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 10; Calabresi & Melamed, supra 
note 10. 
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neither Congress nor the courts are well-equipped to place specific 
values on intangible intellectual property rights. More generally, a simple 
property-rights structure relies upon the market to generate information 
about efficient prices, technologies, and market structures. Thus, where 
bargaining is relatively costless, a property entitlement may do a better 
job of organizing the production of creative works in an efficient manner. 
 In addition, a simpler property rights model is relatively more 
transparent from a policy standpoint. That is, the basic principles 
underlying the entitlement are set forth in relatively broad terms. 
Whether the basis for protection is the need to preserve incentives or to 
reward authors for their labor, these rationales are expressed and 
articulated by the courts in a principled manner as they apply the statute 
to specific cases. Relatedly, the property-rights model is relatively more 
shielded from interest group pressures.67 The substantive simplicity of 
the model makes it more difficult for interested parties to carve out 
exceptions in an unobtrusive manner. Moreover, development of law in 
the courts is relatively more shielded (though of course not completely 
so) from the kinds of interest group pressures that can sometimes 
dominate in the legislative arena.68 
 Just as the virtues are familiar, so are the costs.69 A judicially-
administered property-rights model cannot be as specific or as detailed as 
a more complex legislative solution. Although the basic principles 
underlying the property right may be clear, the application of general 
principles to specific situations may generate substantial uncertainty. A 
less detailed property-rights regime also cannot be tailored as carefully to 
fit particular circumstances or industry structures. Thus, there may be 
cases where the property entitlement is too broad, too narrow, or simply 
inappropriate for a given industry.70 A property-rights approach may also 
be less able to adapt quickly to changing circumstances, as parties in the 
market must rely upon case-by-case development of the law, which can 
often take time. A property-rights model may also pose problems if there 
are high transactions costs standing in the way of efficient bargaining.71 
Finally, judges do not have the advantage of expertise or the ability to 
                                                                  
67 See Burk & Lemley, Policy Levers, supra note 2, at 1637; Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. 
Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEX. L. REV. 873 (1987). 
68 See Joseph P. Liu, Copyright and Time: A Proposal, 101 MICH. L. REV. 409, 452 
(2002). 
69 See supra note 65. 
70 See Crews, Looking Ahead, supra note 8, at 565; Michael Carroll, The Uneasy Case 
Revisited: A Sectoral Approach to Intellectual Property (forthcoming) (do not cite w/out 
permission). 
71 See Wendy Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis 
of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600 (1982). 
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obtain good detailed data on complex issues presented by changing 
markets and technologies.72 
 
II.  THE REGULATORY MODEL 
 
 This Part of the Article develops a model of copyright law that 
stands in sharp contrast to the property-rights model described in the 
previous Part. This Part starts by defining the characteristics of this 
contrasting model and discussing the differences between this 
“regulatory” model and the property-rights model. This Part then makes 
the descriptive claim that Congress has shown an increasing preference 
for this regulatory model in its recent copyright legislation. This Part 
then ends by discussing some of the possible explanations for this shift 




 Before making the descriptive claim, it is necessary to spend some 
time here at the outset describing some of the characteristics of this 
competing model of copyright legislation. In other words, exactly what 
does this Article mean by the term “regulatory copyright?”73 In some 
sense, the term is too broad, insofar as all copyright legislation 
“regulates” the copyright markets. Even copyright legislation based on 
the property-rights model described above regulates copyright markets, 
in the same way that the substantive law of real property regulates real 
property markets. Moreover, there are many points on the spectrum 
between a property rights view and  a more regulatory view. This Article 
uses the term more generally, however, to roughly capture the way in 
which this new model of copyright lawmaking intervenes more 
dramatically in the markets for copyrighted works. 
 By “regulatory,” then, this Article means greater legal intervention in 
the structure and functioning of a particular market, as illustrated by a 
number of different, related characteristics. The first characteristic is 
increased statutory complexity through detailed codification.74 
Regulatory copyright law contains extremely detailed and complex 
statutory provisions allocating rights and responsibilities at a very fine-
                                                                  
72 See Neil Komesar, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, 
ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1994). 
73 For other uses of this term in the context of copyright law, see supra note 12. 
74 Cf. Mark D. Rosen, What Has Happened to the Common Law?--Recent American 
Codifications, and Their Impact on Judicial Practice and the Law's Subsequent 
Development, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 1119; Guido Calabresi, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE 
OF STATUTES (1982). 
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grained and particularized level. Rather than defining a broad property 
entitlement and leaving the courts to apply the entitlement in a case-by-
case manner, the regulatory approach seeks to specify the precise results 
and lay them out in the statute itself. Thus, regulatory copyright is 
generally more detailed and complex.75 
 Second, regulatory copyright is far more industry and technology 
specific. The rights and responsibilities of various parties can vary 
widely according to the particular type of work or the particular industry 
at issue. In some cases, certain types of works might lack certain rights.76 
In other cases, the basic entitlement structure in a given industry-sector 
might be replaced entirely by a compulsory license.77 Exemptions also 
vary substantially, depending upon the type of work.78 In places, 
regulatory copyright can even dictate the adoption of a technology within 
certain markets, or forbid the distribution of a technology within other 
markets.79 Thus regulatory copyright is far more context-sensitive and 
aims to tailor its requirements to specific industries and markets. 
 Third, regulatory copyright is willing to intervene far more deeply in 
the actual structure of copyright markets. Instead of merely setting the 
property entitlement and leaving the market to allocate the distribution of 
these entitlements, the regulatory approach seeks to dictate, in greater 
detail, the precise structure and allocation of rights within the market. 
For example, in some cases, the approach might enact a compulsory 
license, dictating the terms of the license (including the price) for an 
entire industry or part of that industry.80 In other cases, the approach 
might levy a tax on certain activities and redistribute the proceeds to 
other parties.81 In still other cases, the regulatory approach may affect the 
technology adopted by the players in that industry. In all of these cases, 
copyright law intervenes far more deeply into the structure of the 
copyright markets. 
 Fourth and finally, the approach vests more policy-making power in 
Congress and, in some cases, the Librarian of Congress, rather than the 
courts. Exemptions from liability are spelled out in the statute, rather 
than left to the courts for case-by-case development in light of general 
                                                                  
75 See Peter H. Schuck, Legal Complexity: Some Causes, Consequences, And Cures, 42 
DUKE L.J. 1 (1992).  
76 For example, sound recordings lack a general public performance right. 17 U.S.C. § 
106(4).  
77 See infra Part II.B.2 and II.B.3. 
78 See infra Part II.B.1. 
79 See infra Part II.C.2 and II.C.4. 
80 See infra Part II.B.2 and II.B.3. 
81 See id.; see generally Tom W. Bell, Authors' Welfare: Copyright As A Statutory 
Mechanism For Redistributing Rights, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 229 (2003) (analogizing 
copyright to welfare).  
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principles. These exemptions are often extremely complex and detailed.82 
More generally, the role of the Librarian of Congress (and the Copyright 
Office, within the Library of Congress) under this approach is far 
greater.83 The new role encompasses not only record-keeping, but also 
serving as an expert advisor to Congress on copyright matters (e.g. 
providing technical advice and reports, reviewing and drafting proposed 
legislation),84 rate-setting and distribution of funds for certain 
compulsory licenses,85 and in some cases even substantive rulemaking.86 
 Thus, when this Article discusses this regulatory turn in copyright 
law, it refers broadly to the several related trends described above. 
Together, these characteristics stand for an increasing willingness on the 
part of Congress to intervene more substantially into the nature and 
structure of copyright markets, as opposed to leaving these details to the 
market. Having sketched out the broad outlines of this more regulatory 
approach to copyright law, the rest of this Part makes the descriptive 
claim that more recent copyright legislation has moved toward this 
model and away from the earlier, property-rights model. 
 
B. THE 1976 ACT 
 
 As mentioned above, the 1976 Act retained, at its core, the same 
property-rights model from the preceding copyright acts. However, the 
1976 Act also contained a number of notable departures from the 
property-rights model. In some respects, these parts of the 1976 Act 
represent a tour of the portions that are regularly ignored or glossed over 
in the standard copyright law course, which still focuses the bulk of its 
attention on the parts of the Act that correspond to the traditional, 
property-rights view. Most courses, for example, spend much time 
exploring the broad principles underlying Baker v. Selden87 or Feist v. 
Rural Telephone.88 Few courses, by contrast, spend sustained time on the 
cable or satellite broadcast compulsory licenses or on the detailed 
exemptions for libraries and archives. The lack of sustained focus on 
these narrower and more detailed provisions of the 1976 Act may explain 
why this shift in regulatory approach has not attracted more attention. 
                                                                  
82 See infra Part II.B.1. 
83 See generally 17 U.S.C. §§ 701, et seq. According to the Copyright Office web site 
(http://www.copyright.gov/circs/circ1a.html), the office currently employs 500 
individuals. In the fiscal year 2001, the office registered 601,659 copyrighted and mask 
works. In calendar year 2000, the office collected and disbursed more than $187 million 
from compulsory licenses for cable broadcasts, satellite broadcasts, and AHRA. 
84 17 U.S.C. § 701. 
85 See infra Part II.B.2 and II.B.3. 
86 See 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (a)(1)(C). 
87 101 U.S. 99 (1880). 
88 499 U.S. 340 (1991).  
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1. Industry Specific Exemptions 
 
 As an initial matter, even within the framework of a property-rights 
model, the 1976 Act defined the scope of the basic copyright entitlement 
in a far more specific and finely-grained manner. This is most clearly 
evident in the detailed exemptions from copyright liability. Although the 
1976 Act retained a broad and straightforward grant of exclusive rights,89 
it immediately followed this with a number of extremely detailed, 
complex, and industry-specific “limitations.” 90 Earlier acts had contained 
very few express exemptions from copyright liability, leaving the courts 
to craft more via the fair use doctrine. In the 1976 Act, by contrast, these 
exemptions played a far more central role in setting the scope of the 
entitlement. 
 For example, the exemption for libraries and archives contains 
detailed provisions regarding when libraries can make copies of works in 
their collections.91 Rather than setting forth broad standards for the 
exemption or leaving the issue to fair use, the statute provides a highly-
detailed and specific set of rules. It defines the types of libraries and 
archives that can take advantage of the exemption (e.g. libraries or 
archives open to the public or available to researchers from a particular 
field). It defines the types of works that may be copied. It sets forth the 
acceptable purposes for making copies (e.g. for preservation, interlibrary 
loan, etc.), the number of permissible copies (e.g. only one or a few 
copies, depending on the purpose), and other specific conditions that 
must be satisfied (e.g. in the case of damaged works, the inability to find 
a replacement at a fair price after reasonable effort). It also sets forth 
mandatory notice requirements to be printed on copies or posted near 
photocopiers. 
 The exemption for certain public performances similarly departs 
from the industry-neutral, property-rights model. This exemption 
includes a detailed list of specific activities that are expressly shielded 
from copyright liability.92 The public performance right thus does not 
apply to: performances for face-to-face teaching activities of nonprofit 
educational institutions; performances of certain works in the course of 
services at a place of worship; certain performances with no commercial 
advantage; certain receptions of broadcasts in a public place; 
performances of certain works by “nonprofit agricultural or horticultural 
organization[s]”; performances of musical works by record stores; 
                                                                  
89 17 U.S.C. § 106. 
90 17 U.S.C. §§ 108 – 122. 
91 17 U.S.C. § 108. 
92 17 U.S.C. § 110. 
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certain performances for the blind; and performances by veterans or 
fraternal organizations. These exemptions are highly targeted, singling 
out specific groups or activities for special treatment. Again, this 
represents a departure from a more industry-neutral, property-rights 
regime.  
 The 1976 Act also contains very specific exemptions for the 
broadcast industries. Under these exemptions, radio and television 
stations can make certain temporary copies of broadcasts in the course of 
broadcasting or for purposes of preservation and archiving.93 Again, the 
exemption is extremely detailed. It limits the purposes for which such 
copies can be used and in some cases mandates destruction of copies 
after a set period of time. This provision also contains separate 
exemptions for broadcasts by governmental bodies or other nonprofit 
organizations. The exemption is thus designed to tailor the application of 
the act to the specific needs of the broadcast industries. 
 Not only are the exemptions industry-specific, they also contain 
detailed requirements defining the conditions under which they apply. 
The exemption for libraries described above is an example.94 Another 
example is the public performance exemption for the reception of radio 
broadcasts in a public place.95 This exemption was recently amended in 
199896 to resolve a dispute between the owners of copyrights in musical 
works and owners of retail stores and restaurants, who often played radio 
broadcasts in their stores. The resultant compromise is an extremely 
detailed exemption, which sets forth extensive requirements for retail 
establishments and restaurants. The exemption specifies not only the 
nature of the permitted uses, but also such details as permissible square 
footage (“less than 2,000 gross square feet of space (excluding space 
used for customer parking and for no other purpose)” for retail stores), 
the number of speakers and types of receiving equipment (“not more 
than 4 loudspeakers … located in any 1 room or adjoining outdoor 
space”), and other requirements. 
 These exemptions thus begin to depart from the industry-neutral, 
property-rights model of the earlier acts.97 The exemptions are far more 
detailed and complex than the rules that the courts could have crafted 
                                                                  
93 17 U.S.C. § 112. 
94 17 U.S.C. § 108. 
95 17 U.S.C. § 110. 
96 See Fairness in Music Licensing Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-298 (Title II); Laurence 
R. Helfer, World Music On A U.S. Stage: A Berne/Trips And Economic Analysis Of The 
Fairness In Music Licensing Act, 80 B.U. L. REV. 93 (2000).  
97 Other exemptions include exemptions for making and transferring copies of computer 
software, 17 U.S.C. § 109, 117; certain limitations on the rights associated with pictorial, 
graphic, and sculptural works, 17 U.S.C. § 113; exemptions for noncommercial 
broadcasters, 17 U.S.C. § 118; limitations on rights for architectural works, 17 U.S.C. § 
120; exemptions for reproduction for persons with disabilities, 17 U.S.C. § 121. 
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under the fair use defense, establishing very specific requirements rather 
than relying upon broader standards and principles. The exemptions are 
also far more industry-specific, expressly singling out specific types of 
works, specific industries, and specific uses of copyrighted works for 
special treatment. These exemptions are also enacted expressly into the 
statute itself, rather than left to the courts for case-by-case development. 
As will be discussed below in more detail, these detailed exemptions 
resulted from political compromises hammered out by the relevant 
industries in the drafting of the 1976 Act. They thus represent an attempt 
to establish clear rules, balancing the interests of the relevant parties. 
 At the same time, the exemptions standing alone represent a 
relatively limited departure from the property-rights view. To some 
extent, detailed codification is not necessarily inconsistent with a 
property-rights model. It might be quite possible to have a property 
entitlement that exhibits a high degree of statutory complexity, leaving 
again the markets to allocate distribution of that entitlement. Thus, if the 
1976 Act had limited itself solely to defining the exemptions in a more 
detailed fashion, it might fall more squarely within the traditional 
property-rights model. However, the 1976 Act contained additional 
provisions that pushed beyond simply greater specificity, and these 
detailed exemptions should be understood in light of these additional 
provisions. 
 
2. Mechanical and Jukebox Compulsory Licenses 
 
 More significantly from a regulatory point of view, the 1976 Act 
made greater use of compulsory licenses and established them more 
firmly as an alternative to a property entitlement. The mechanical license 
from the 1909 Act was preserved, largely in the same form (though with 
greater detail and some slight modifications), in the 1976 Act.98 By this 
time, of course, the relevant technology was not piano rolls but sound 
recordings on record albums and tapes.99 Thus, once a musical work 
owner had authorized distribution of a sound recording, other artists 
could record and distribute copies of that musical work upon payment of 
a statutorily-set licensing fee.100 It is interesting to note that, despite the 
compulsory license procedure set forth in the statute, private parties often 
bargained around the statutory compulsory license, reaching their own 
                                                                  
98 17 U.S.C. § 115.  
99 Theresa M. Bevilacqua, Note, Time To Say Good-Bye To Madonna's American Pie: 
Why Mechanical Compulsory Licensing Should Be Put To Rest, 19 CARDOZO ARTS & 
ENT. L.J. 285 (2001). 
100 The rate is currently set at 2 3/4 cents per copy or 1/2 of 1 cent per minute or fraction 
thereof, whichever is greater. See 37 C.F.R § 255.3. 
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terms and conditions.101 This indicates that, although the Act intervened 
in the market by setting up a compulsory licensing scheme, the parties 
could nevertheless bargain around it. 
 The 1976 Act also contained a similar compulsory license for 
jukebox operators.102 Under the original 1909 Act, performances by coin-
operated machines were exempted from liability entirely. In the 1976 
Act, such performances were subject to a statutory compulsory license.103 
Later amendments to the act replaced the statutory license with a 
preference for a negotiated license.104 However, in the absence of a 
negotiated license, the license would be set through arbitration by the 
Copyright Royalty Tribunal (later replaced by Copyright Arbitration 
Royalty Panels). The function and role of these royalty-setting 
institutions will be discussed in more detail below, but for present 
purposes, it is important to note that the Act carved out another 
compulsory license for coin-operated music-playing devices such as 
jukeboxes. 
 
3. Cable and Satellite Compulsory Licenses 
 
 Although both of the compulsory licenses described above departed 
from the property-rights model, they did so in rather straightforward 
ways, defining a relatively simple compulsory license structure. The 
same could not be said for the cable broadcasting compulsory license. 
Responding to the advent of a new industry, the 1976 Act contained an 
exceptionally complex compulsory license provision, which enabled 
cable television providers to re-transmit broadcast television stations.105 
The provision was the result of concerns that the broadcast industries 
(both broadcast stations and the owners of specific shows) might refuse 
to license transmission of their on-air broadcasts to cable companies for 
                                                                  
101 See Loren, supra note 7; Ralph Oman, The Compulsory License Redux: Will It Survive 
In A Changing Marketplace?, 5 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 37 (1986) (charting rise of 
the compulsory license); see generally Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: 
Dividing a Legal Entitlement to Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027, 1037-38 
(1995). 
102 17 U.S.C. § 116. See generally Scott M. Martin, The Berne Convention And The U.S. 
Compulsory License For Jukeboxes: Why The Song Could Not Remain The Same, 37 J. 
COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 262 (1990); Marilyn S. Wise, Trials Of The Tribunal: Toward 
A Fair Distribution Of Jukebox Royalties, 16 SW. U. L. REV. 757 (1986).  
103 Though apparently this compulsory license was widely disregarded. See Loren, supra 
note 7. 
104 17 U.S.C. § 116. 
105 See 17 U.S.C. § 116. Note that this provision also exempted certain re-transmissions 
by non-cable companies, e.g. retransmission via cable by a hotel or apartment building to 
the residents of the building. 17 U.S.C. § 116(A)(1). 
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re-transmission to their paying customers.106 Congress accordingly 
enacted a compulsory license, which ensured that cable companies would 
be able to provide their customers with access to broadcast television, 
while still compensating the broadcast industries.107 
 The resultant legislation, which was hammered out in detail by the 
cable and broadcast industries, was extremely complex and detailed. The 
compulsory license imposes very detailed reporting requirements on 
cable companies. Every six months, cable companies are required to file 
a statement of account with the Copyright Office, setting forth: the 
number of cable channels rebroadcasting the signals; the names of the 
broadcast stations they were retransmitting; total number of subscribers; 
gross amounts paid to the cable companies resulting from retransmission; 
and any other data the Copyright Office requires. The statute then sets 
forth the specific royalty rate that the cable companies must pay, based 
on gross receipts from customers, for various acts of re-transmission (e.g. 
0.675 of 1 per centum of gross receipts …).108 
 The cable company must deposit any fees due under the compulsory 
license with the Copyright Office. The statute then sets up a separate 
procedure for distributing the proceeds to the copyright owners. 
Copyright owners whose shows were re-transmitted under the 
compulsory license can file claims for royalties in July of every year. In 
August, the Copyright Office will determine if there is any controversy 
over how the funds should be distributed (the statute expressly states that 
the parties may themselves agree to a distribution of the royalties). If any 
such controversy exists, the matter is then transferred to a Copyright 
Arbitration Royalty Panel109 for resolution. Decisions are then subject to 
judicial review.110 
                                                                  
106 See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476 (1976) (“The Committee believes that cable systems are 
commercial enterprises whose basic retransmission operations are based on the carriage 
of copyrighted program material and that copyright royalties should be paid by cable 
operators to the creators of such programs. The Committee recognizes, however, that it 
would be impractical and unduly burdensome to require every cable system to negotiate 
with every copyright owner whose work was retransmitted by a cable system."). 
107 See generally C. H. Dobal, Note, A Proposal To Amend The Cable Compulsory 
License Provisions Of The 1976 Copyright Act, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 699 (1988). 
108 17 U.S.C. § 116. Subject to adjustment. See National Cable Television Ass'n v. 
Copyright Royalty Tribunal, 689 F.2d 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
109 Under the 1976 Act, these decisions were made by the Copyright Royalty Tribunal, 
the institutional predecessor of the Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panels. 
110 See, e.g., National Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Tribunal, 848 F.2d 
1289 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Cablevision Systems Development Co. v. Motion Picture Ass'n of 
Am., 836 F.2d 599 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Cablevision Systems Development Co. v. Motion 
Picture Ass'n of Am., 808 F.2d 133 (D.C. Cir. 1987); National Cable Television Ass'n, 
Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Tribunal, 724 F.2d 176 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Christian 
Broadcasting Network, Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Tribunal, 720 F.2d 1295 (D.C. Cir. 
1983). 
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 The cable compulsory license thus represented an even more 
significant departure from the industry-neutral, property rights regime.111 
Here, the statute expressly singled out a particular industry for special 
treatment. It further dictated the very detailed terms of the compulsory 
license, including detailed reporting provisions, special definitions, and 
fee schedules. In many ways, the text of the provision reads like a private 
licensing agreement struck between private parties (which it in effect 
was, albeit one enacted into law by Congress).112 Indeed, much of the 
terminology in the provision would be entirely opaque to anyone not 
familiar with the details of the industries at issue.113 Moreover, unlike 
some of the previous compulsory licenses, the fees were not paid directly 
to the copyright owners. Instead, the Copyright Office pooled the 
receipts and then later redistributed the amounts to copyright owners in 
response to specific claims, with disputes being resolved by the 
Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panels.  In all these respects, the provision 
intervenes much more directly into the details of a particular market. 
 The 1976 Act was later amended to include similar compulsory 
licenses for satellite retransmissions of broadcast television.114 These 
provisions rival, if not exceed, the cable compulsory license in 
complexity. The provisions share many of the same characteristics as the 
cable television compulsory license, e.g. extremely detailed conditions; 
reporting requirements; rate setting by the Copyright Arbitration Royalty 
Panels; provisions for redistribution of royalties; separate definitions. 
These provisions further contain even more detailed provisions tailored 
to the specifics of the satellite broadcast industry, including: detailed 
distinctions between types of initial broadcast feeds that are subject to 
                                                                  
111 Ralph Oman, The Compulsory License Redux: Will It Survive In A Changing 
Marketplace?, 5 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 37, 44 (1986) (“In examining the history of 
copyright in the United States over the last twenty years, one might reasonably conclude 
that the largest economic shift in copyright policy occurred when Congress created this 
license.”). 
112 See Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, supra note 47, at 869. 
113 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 111(d)(1)(B), which reads, in part: 
“except in the case of a cable system whose royalty is specified in subclause (C) or (D), a 
total royalty fee for the period covered by the statement, computed on the basis of 
specified percentages of the gross receipts from subscribers to the cable service during 
said period for the basic service of providing secondary transmissions of primary 
broadcast transmitters, as follows: (i) 0.675 of 1 per centum of such gross receipts for the 
privilege of further transmitting any nonnetwork programming of a primary transmitter in 
whole or in part beyond the local service area of such primary transmitter, such amount to 
be applied against the fee, if any, payable pursuant to paragraphs (ii) through (iv); (ii) 
0.675 of 1 per centum of such gross receipts for the first distant signal equivalent; (iii) 
0.425 of 1 per centum of such gross receipts for each of the second, third, and fourth 
distant signal equivalents …”  
114 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 119 (general satellite retransmission license); 122 (local-to-local 
satellite retransmission license). 
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the license; detailed geographical limitations (for “unserved households,” 
along with specific measures to calculate when such households are 
unserved); separate penalties for violation of certain terms of the license; 
ways of measuring signal intensity; and even sections governing 
application to recreational vehicles and commercial trucks. The satellite 
retransmission compulsory license represents an even clearer example of 
the regulatory approach. 
 It is worth noting, with all of these compulsory licenses, the 
increasingly prominent role of the Librarian of Congress and, 
specifically, the Copyright Office and the Copyright Arbitration Royalty 
Panels. With any compulsory license, some entity must set the rate, as 
the market no longer does so (as it would under a pure property rights 
regime).115 In some cases, the rate is set by the statute. In other cases, the 
statute delegates that responsibility to a rate-setting institution under 
supervision of the Librarian of Congress. Originally, the 1976 Act vested 
this power in a permanent administrative body, the Copyright Royalty 
Tribunal.116 Later, the power was vested in ad hoc Copyright Arbitration 
Royalty Panels convened by the Librarian of Congress.117 In either case, 
the statute gives an administrative body within the Library of Congress 
the power to set prices in a particular market for certain types of licenses. 
Moreover, in some cases, the administrative body is also charged with 
accepting and holding royalty payments in a centralized manner, and 
then disbursing payments to copyright owners in response to filed 
claims.  
 The responsibilities of the Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panels are 
expressly set forth in a separate chapter of the Copyright Act.118 The 
Librarian of Congress is authorized to appoint and convene such panels, 
                                                                  
115 The general advantages and disadvantages of compulsory licenses have been debated 
in detail elsewhere. See, e.g., Merges, Contracting, supra note 61; Robert P. Merges, Of 
Property Rules, Coase, And Intellectual Property, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2655 (1994); 
Darlene A. Cote, Note, Chipping Away At The Copyright Owner's Rights: Congress' 
Continued Reliance On The Compulsory License, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 219 (1994). For 
present purposes, I am less interested about the merits of the debate, and more interested 
in the regulatory implications once the Act recognizes some compulsory licenses. 
116 The actions of the Copyright Royalty Tribunal were subject to significant criticism 
and litigation. In particular, the statute provided little guidance regarding how royalties 
were to be distributed, leading to much litigation. E.g., Recording Industry Assoc. of 
America v. Copyright Royalty Tribunal, 662 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1981); National Cable 
Television Assoc. v. Copyright Royalty Tribunal, 689 F.2d 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1982); 
Christian Broadcasting Network v. Copyright Royalty Tribunal, 720 F.2d 1295 (D.C. Cir. 
1983); National Assoc. of Broadcaster v. Copyright Royalty Tribunal, 772 F.2d 922 
(D.C. Cir. 1985). Much of this criticism led to the Copyright Royalty Tribunal Reform 
Act of 1993. 
117 Copyright Royalty Tribunal Reform Act of 1993. See generally 17 U.S.C. §§ 801, et 
seq. 
118 17 U.S.C. §§ 801, et seq. 
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upon recommendation of the Register of Copyrights. The panels are then 
charged with setting “reasonable copyright royalty rates” for the 
applicable compulsory licenses, and in doing so are asked to further 
various objectives, such as: maximizing the availability of creative works 
to the public; affording copyright owners a fair return; and minimizing 
the disruptive impact on existing industry structures.119 The panels are 
also charged with resolving disputes over distribution of royalty proceeds 
to copyright owners. This section also contains detailed provisions on the 
selection and payment of arbitrators, as well as procedures for 
conducting arbitrations. The panels thus act in both a rate-setting context 
and in an adjudicatory context. 120 
 The 1976 Act thus set up an ongoing administrative structure to deal 
with rate setting for compulsory licenses. In so doing, the Act established 
a clear, alternative structure for dealing with copyright regulation, a 
structure that Congress would subsequently utilize in regulating other 
copyright industries.121 In addition to the compulsory licenses already 
mentioned above, the 1976 Act contained a compulsory license for 
public broadcast stations (with rates established by the Copyright 
Royalty Tribunal).122 Future amendments to the Act would also take 
advantage of this alternate structure. So, for example, the Audio Home 
Recording Act of 1992 made use of the Copyright Royalty Tribunal.123 
More recently, the new digital performance right for sound recordings 
uses the structure of compulsory licenses.124 Both of these provisions will 
be discussed in more detail below. 
 
                                                                  
119 Id. 
120 Note pending Copyright Royalty and Distribution Reform Act (H.R. 1417) (2003), 
which seeks to reduce costs and improve administrative efficiencies of the CARPs.  See 
also Statement of Marybeth Peters Register of Copyrights before the Subcommittee on 
Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property Committee on the Judiciary United States 
House of Representatives 108th Congress, 1st Session (April 1, 2003) regarding the 
Copyright Royalty and Distribution Reform Act (H.R. 1417) (detailing high 
administrative costs of the existing system, and in particular the institutional burden 
imposed by the ad hoc nature of the panels); Statement of Marybeth Peters The Register 
of Copyrights before the Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property 
Committee on the Judiciary United States House of Representatives 107th Congress, 2nd 
Session (June 13, 2002) on CARP (Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panel) Structure and 
Process (detailing history of CARPs and suggesting improvements). See Maxey, Note, 
That Carp Is No Keeper: Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panels--Change Is Needed, Here 
Is Why, And How, 10 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 385 (2003). 
121 Ralph Oman, The Compulsory License Redux: Will It Survive In A Changing 
Marketplace?, 5 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 37 (1986) (charting rise of the compulsory 
license).  
122 17 U.S.C. § 118.  
123 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001, et seq. 
124 17 U.S.C. § 114. 
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C. THE 1976 ACT AMENDMENTS 
 
 In many ways, the 1976 Act was a hybrid act. At its core, lay the 
original property-rights model of the earlier copyright acts. On top of this 
core, however, the Act grafted on more detailed, industry-specific 
exemptions. More significantly, it displaced the property-rights model 
entirely in parts of a few select industries (e.g. mechanical license, cable 
television, public broadcasting). Although the substantive coverage of 
these industries was still relatively limited (certainly as compared to the 
industries still dominated by the property-rights model), the compulsory 
license structure set up an alternative framework for future legislation.  
 As we will see below, many of the major amendments since the 1976 
Act have taken advantage of this framework and increasingly adopted a 
regulatory model. Indeed, the size and complexity of the copyright act 
has dramatically increased in the years since 1976, and these 
amendments are primarily responsible for this trend.125 Moreover, recent 





 First, however, it is worth noting an exception to the trend, namely 
the amendments to the 1976 Act that were designed to adapt the Act to 
new computer technologies. During the substantial work that went into 
the drafting of the 1976 Act, it became increasingly apparent that 
advances in photocopying and computer technology would have a 
dramatic impact on the copyright markets, and that the revised Act 
should take account of these changes. At the same time, the drafters 
recognized that much of the substantial work that had already been put 
into the revision might be put in jeopardy if it had to be re-opened to take 
into account the complex issues presented by new technology. As a 
result, new issues presented by new computer technologies were 
temporarily tabled and handed over for study by a congressional 
commission expressly set up to consider the potential impact of 
technology on copyright: the National Commission on New 
Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU).126 
 Established in 1974, CONTU was charged with the task of studying 
these new technologies and issuing recommendations to Congress for 
                                                                  
125 See infra, Appendix A. 
126 See Arthur R. Miller, Copyright Protection For Computer Programs, Databases, And 
Computer- Generated Works: Is Anything New Since CONTU?, 106 HARV. L. REV. 977 
(1993); Pamela Samuelson, CONTU Revisited: The Case Against Copyright Protection 
For Computer Programs In Machine-Readable Form, 1984 DUKE L.J. 663 (1984).  
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amending the Copyright Act. The commission consisted of various 
experts from the relevant fields of law and technology. After four years 
of study, CONTU issued its final report in 1978, along with specific 
recommendations for amendments to the 1976 Act.127 Hearings were 
held in the House in 1980, and legislation was subsequently passed 
implementing modified versions of the recommendations.128 
 In its final report, CONTU recommended that only minor changes be 
made to the copyright act to account for new computer technology. The 
baseline conclusion was that existing copyright laws were up to the task 
of dealing with new challenges presented by computer technology and in 
particular computer software. CONTU recommended that the Act be 
amended to expressly recognize computer software as a “literary work” 
subject to copyright protection.129 In addition, CONTU recommended 
certain minor changes to give owners of copies of software the right to 
run software on their computers, make backup copies, and transfer copies 
to third parties.130 Other than these minor adjustments, however, CONTU 
concluded that new types of works like software should generally be 
subject to the same basic structure of copyright protection as other 
works. The courts, then, would be left with the task of applying existing 
copyright principles to these new works in a case-by-case fashion. 
 The CONTU approach is notable here for its reliance on the 
property-rights model of copyright regulation. Rather than propose a 
complex statutory scheme (complete with detailed provisions) to deal 
specifically with computer software, CONTU consciously chose to bring 
computer software within the general scope of the basic copyright 
entitlement. In part, this reflected a view that existing copyright 
principles were sufficient to deal with the challenges presented by 
computer software. In part, this also reflected an acknowledgement that 
the commissioners lacked good hard data on how this nascent industry 
would eventually play out. CONTU thus left the case-by-case application 
of the law to the courts, which over the next several decades 
subsequently adapted existing copyright principles to the special case of 
computer software.131 
                                                                  
127 FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF 
COPYRIGHTED WORKS (1978) (hereinafter “CONTU Final Report”). 
128 Computer Software Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 117, 94 STAT. 3028 (1980) 
(codified at 17 U.S.C. § 117). 
129 See CONTU Final Report. 
130 17 U.S.C. § 117. 
131 See, e.g., Apple Computer v. Franklin, 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 
464 U.S. 1033 (1984); Computer Assoc. Int’l v. Altai, 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1993); Lotus 
Development Corp. v. Borland Int’l, 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995); Sega Enterp. v. 
Accolade, 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1993). 
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 Whether this approach was the proper approach is an issue that has 
generated much discussion and one that is beyond the scope of this 
Article.132 It is important to note here, however, that the approach 
adopted by CONTU in response to new technology reflected, in many 
ways, an adherence to the property-rights model rather than the expressly 
regulatory model. 
 
2. Audio Home Recording Act of 1992 
 
 Congress adopted a very different approach when faced with new 
digital recording technology. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, after the 
successful introduction of the compact disc, the consumer electronics 
industry was about to introduce digital audio tape technology, which 
would permit consumers for the first time to make digital copies of 
recorded music. The music industry, fearing the piracy potential 
presented by a technology that could make perfect copies, filed suit 
against the consumer electronics manufacturers on grounds of 
contributory liability.133 The result was to delay introduction of the new 
technology, as there was much uncertainty surrounding how the courts 
would apply the rule from Sony v. Universal City Studios,134 the Supreme 
Court decision that permitted continued sale of the VCR.  
 In order to break the deadlock, representatives of both industries 
negotiated a compromise, which Congress subsequently enacted into law 
as the Audio Home Recording Act of 1992 (AHRA).135 The Act 
immunized consumers from direct liability for making personal copies of 
recorded music and device manufacturers from indirect liability for 
selling digital audio tape decks.136 In exchange, the Act required device 
manufacturers to place in their devices technologies to prevent serial 
copying of recorded music.137 This technology would permit consumers 
to make a digital copy of recorded music, but would prevent consumers 
from making subsequent digital copies from that copy. The Act also 
                                                                  
132 See, e.g., CONTU Final Report (Dissent of Commissioner Hersey); Miller, Copyright 
Protection, supra note 126; Samuelson, CONTU Revisited, supra note 126; Pamela 
Samuelson, et al., A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 
94 COLUM. L. REV. 2308 (1994); Peter Menell, The Challenges of Reforming Intellectual 
Property Protection for Computer Software, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2644 (1994). 
133 Cahn v. Sony Corp., No. 90 Civ. 4537 (S.D.N.Y. July 11, 1991); Gary S. Lutzker, 
Note, Dat's All Folks: Cahn v. Sony and the Audio Home Recording Act of 1991--Merrie 
Melodies or Looney Tunes?, 11 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 145 (1992). See Lewis 
Kurlantzick & Jacqueline E. Pennino, The Audio Home Recording Act Of 1992 And The 
Formation Of Copyright Policy, 45 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 497 (1998). 
134 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984). 
135 Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001, et seq. 
136 17 U.S.C. § 1008. 
137 17 U.S.C. § 1002. 
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imposed a levy on the sale of every digital audio recording device (2 
percent of the “transfer price” as defined in the statute) and on any blank 
audio medium (3 percent of the transfer price) used to make such 
recordings.138 The proceeds from the levy would then be redistributed by 
the Copyright Office to the owners of copyrights in the sound recordings 
(66 2/3%) and musical works (33 1/3%), and within those groups 
according to negotiated settlements or, in the absence of such, by a 
copyright arbitration royalty panel.139 
 The AHRA represented a significant extension of the regulatory 
copyright approach in a number of respects. First, the AHRA’s royalty 
did more than simply set up a compulsory license. In previous 
compulsory licenses, the Act tied payment of the license directly to 
actual use of the underlying copyrighted work (whether in a “cover,” in a 
jukebox, or over a cable or satellite broadcast). In the AHRA, by 
contrast, the royalty was tied, not to direct use of the underlying 
copyrighted work, but to the sale of devices and products that could be 
used to engage in copying of the underlying copyrighted works. Thus, 
the AHRA essentially imposed a tax or levy on a separate, though 
related, market, for redistribution to copyright holders. 
 Second, and relatedly, the distribution provisions were more 
complex. With the cover license, the royalties were due directly to the 
owners of the works that were actually used. Similarly, with the satellite 
and cable licenses, royalties are also due to owners of works that were 
actually used, although in this case, the owners themselves had to file 
claims against a pool of collected royalties. Under the AHRA, however, 
no mechanism existed to directly monitor which works were being 
copied by consumers. Accordingly, distributions to parties within each of 
the relevant groups of owners were to be made according to certain 
proxies: sales of recorded music (for both the sound recording and 
musical work owners) and numbers of broadcasts (for musical work 
owners). Thus, distribution of the proceeds involved more complexity. 
 Third, and perhaps most significantly, the AHRA for the first time 
expressly regulated technology within a particular market. The AHRA 
essentially contained a technology mandate for digital recording devices. 
The Act required that such devices implement a specific, then-existing 
technology (i.e. “Serial Copyright Management System”) or a system 
that had “the same functional characteristics.”140 Devices that did not 
contain this technology were essentially banned. Attempts to sell or 
import non-conforming devices would subject individuals to liability 
under the AHRA. 
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 In these ways, the AHRA thus departed dramatically from the 
property-rights model. The AHRA intervened in the structure of, not just 
a copyright industry (i.e. the music industry), but also a related consumer 
electronics industry. It imposed a royalty, not on the use of a copyrighted 
work, but on the sale of related goods for later redistribution to copyright 
owners. And it mandated the adoption of a specific technology in that 
market. In all these ways, the AHRA bore scant resemblance to the 
industry-neutral, court-administered property rights regime of the earlier 
Acts. Moreover, the AHRA represented an extension of the regulatory 
model, beyond just a limited slice of the copyright market (as in the case 
of cable or satellite television), to encompass a greater portion of the 
copyright market (i.e. recorded music and consumer electronics). 
 The subsequent history of the AHRA serves to highlight some of the 
potential limits of the regulatory approach. Today, the AHRA has only 
limited practical applicability, as the technology markets have largely 
bypassed it.141 The AHRA was based on an assumption by the involved 
parties that consumers would use specialized devices to record music 
digitally. Instead, however, consumers have increasingly used general-
purpose computers to engage in digital music recording. Because of the 
former assumption, the AHRA’s royalty structure does not apply to 
multi-purpose computer equipment (e.g. computers or CD burners) or 
general-purpose recording media such as blank CD-ROMs, which can be 
used to record both music and data.142 Because the technology shifted 
beneath the AHRA in unanticipated ways, the detailed statutory 
compromise it represents is largely irrelevant today. This Article will 
discuss some of the implications of this development in more detail 
below. 
 
3. Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995 
 
 A short three years after the AHRA, Congress again intervened in 
the market for music copyrights, this time with the exceptionally 
complex Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995 
(DPRSRA). In 1972, Congress added sound recordings to the list of 
works protected by copyright. However, sound recording owners did not 
                                                                  
141 See Niels Schaumann, Copyright Infringement And Peer-To-Peer Technology, 28 
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1001, 1010 (2002); Sheldon W. Halpern, Copyright Law in the 
Digital Age: Malum In Se and Malum Prohibitum, 4 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 8 
(2000); Stephanie Skasko Rosenberg, Note, Anticipating Technology: A Statute Bytes The 
Dust In Recording Industry Ass'n Of America V. Diamond Multimedia Systems, Inc., 45 
VILL. L. REV. 483 (2000). 
142 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001(3), (4)(B)(ii), (5)(B)(ii); Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. 
Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc. 180 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 1999); A&M Records v. Napster, 
239 F.3d 1004, 1024 (9th Cir. 2001). 
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obtain the exclusive right to control public performances. This was due 
largely to the lobbying power of the broadcast industries, which did not 
want to have to pay an additional royalty (beyond the one due to the 
owners of the musical works) for broadcasting recorded music.143 With 
the advent of the internet, the sound recording copyright owners voiced 
concerns that digital delivery of sound recordings over the internet might 
significantly cut into the market for sales of sound recordings. In 
response, Congress enacted the DPRSRA, granting sound recording 
owners a limited right to control digital public performances.144 
 The DPRSRA is quite possibly the most complex copyright 
provision yet enacted.145 In size, the provision rivals the entire 1909 
Copyright Act. And in detail, the terminology and specificity make the 
provision almost entirely opaque to someone who is not familiar with the 
relevant industries. As an initial matter, the DPRSRA simply amends the 
list of exclusive rights, to give sound recording owners this additional 
right to control digital public performances.146 However, the act then 
subjects the new right to a number of extremely complex exemptions and 
compulsory licenses, encompassing digital performances, temporary 
digital copies, and digital covers.  
 A comprehensive description of the DPRSRA is beyond the scope of 
this Article.147 However, it is worth highlighting a number of the main 
provisions to illustrate the complexity of this enactment. First, certain 
non-interactive, nonsubscription digital transmissions are exempted 
(subject to a number of complex qualifications). Thus, for example, 
digital radio broadcasts of recorded music (like analog radio broadcasts) 
are not generally subject to the digital public performance right (although 
they remain subject to the general public performance right for musical 
works). Second, certain interactive, subscription digital transmissions are 
fully subject to the digital performance right. Thus, for example, 
                                                                  
143 See Loren, Untangling, supra note 7. 
144 See Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright And Control Over New Technologies Of 
Dissemination, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1613, 1630 (2001).  
145 17 U.S.C. § 114(d). See Nimmer, Ignoring the Public, supra note 7.  
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A. Dustin Mets, Note, Did Congress Protect The Recording Industry Into Competition? 
The Irony Of The Digital Performance Right In Sound Recordings Act, 22 U. DAYTON L. 
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providers of internet music on demand must negotiate directly with the 
sound recording owners for a license. 
 Third, and most importantly for the purposes of this Article, certain 
non-interactive, subscription digital transmissions (e.g. through 
“webcasting”) are subject to a complex statutory compulsory license 
scheme. The statute sets forth a number of highly-specific categories of 
transmissions subject to the compulsory license scheme, with extensive 
requirements, sub-requirements, and exceptions (covering such details as 
extent of performances, publication of program information, duration of 
performances, compliance with copy-protection technologies, etc.). The 
statute indicates a preference for voluntarily-negotiated licensing rates 
and terms. In the absence of agreement, however, actual licensing rates 
and terms are to be set by a copyright arbitration royalty panel, in a 
fashion that mimics what the marketplace would have established. The 
statute provides a detailed procedure (including notice in the federal 
register) for the setting of such rates and terms. It also gives the 
Copyright Office the authority to establish the kinds of reporting 
requirements necessary to ensure compliance with the licenses. The 
statute then states that an agent designated to distribute receipts of the 
licensing revenues shall distribute the receipts according to a statutory 
formula to owners of the digital performance right (50%), recording 
artists (45%), and to various escrow accounts for non-featured musicians 
(2.5%) and non-featured vocalists (2.5%).  
 After enactment of the DPRSRA, the Librarian of Congress initiated 
proceedings for setting the terms and rates of the compulsory license. In 
accordance with the DPRSRA, the Librarian published notice in the 
federal register of voluntary negotiations by interested parties. It then 
convened a copyright arbitration panel and charged it with the task of 
setting licenses. The resulting license terms and rates were subject to 
much criticism when issued. In particular, many smaller internet radio 
stations objected that the rates, as set by the Librarian of Congress, 
would essentially drive them completely out of business. [More 
descriptions of the subsequent history.]148 
 The DPRSRA thus presents perhaps the most dramatic application of 
the regulatory approach. In this case, the copyright act is extensively 
involved in the shape and structure of a particular copyright market, 
namely the market for digital performances of recorded music. Rather 
than leaving the market to be structured according to private agreements 
(whether individually or by collective rights organizations), the Act steps 
in and enacts an extremely detailed compulsory license structure, with 
extremely detailed qualifications and definitions. Although it shows an 
initial preference for a negotiated license between industry players, it 
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ultimately gives a copyright arbitration panel the power to dictate the 
terms and conditions (including fees) of the resulting licenses for that 
industry. Finally, it dictates how the proceeds of the compulsory license 
are to be split up by various interested parties. Again, this is a significant 
departure from the original, property-rights view. 
 It is noteworthy that, like the AHRA, the DPRSRA deals, not with an 
established industry, but with a nascent industry, for which little 
information exists. Moreover, the scope of the Librarian of Congress’s 
involvement in dictating the terms of the licenses in that industry is even 
more extensive than in the AHRA. Thus, in many ways, the DPRSRA 
represents the most significant recent example of the regulatory 
approach, one that pushes the model even further in the regulatory 
direction. 
 
4. Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 
 
 Although the DPRSRA probably represents the most extensive 
example of the regulatory approach, the recent Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act of 1998 (DMCA) provided a slightly new twist to the 
approach.149 Congress enacted the DMCA in an attempt to update 
copyright law in light of perceived challenges of the digital environment. 
The DMCA contained many separate provisions. Some of the provisions 
dealt with liability for intermediaries such as internet service 
providers.150 These provisions of the DMCA exempted ISPs from direct 
and indirect liability for certain activities such as system caching and 
temporary storage and forwarding. The DMCA also enacted a safe 
harbor, shielding ISPs from liability for storing subscriber content, under 
certain circumstances. These provisions generally provided more 
specificity and guidance to ISPs, who had been concerned about 
potentially extensive liability under the copyright act. 
 More important for our purposes, the DMCA also contained separate 
provisions supporting industry attempts to protect copyrighted works 
through use of technology.151 In particular, the DMCA provided a 
separate cause of action against acts of circumvention of technologies 
that controlled access to, or prevented copying of, copyrighted materials. 
The DMCA contained a number of very specific statutory exemptions.152 
It also gave the Librarian of Congress the power to exempt certain 
                                                                  
149 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201, et seq. 
150 17 U.S.C. § 512. 
151 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201, et seq.; § 1202. 
152 17 U.S.C. § 1201(d)-(k). See Honorable Lewis A. Kaplan, Copyright And The 
Internet, 22 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 1 (2003) (“I think it fair to say that these 
exemptions are narrow and difficult to satisfy”).  
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categories of works from anti-circumvention liability.153 The DMCA also 
banned distribution of technologies with a primary purpose of facilitating 
circumvention. Finally, the DMCA also provided a cause of action for 
tampering with or removing copyright management information attached 
to copyrighted works.154 
 In some respects, these latter aspects of the DMCA do not depart too 
much from the property-rights approach. Although the DMCA has 
generated much debate,155 some aspects of its regulatory approach are 
not that different from the older property-rights approach. The DMCA 
can be viewed as creating an additional property entitlement against 
circumvention, as a way of providing additional support to the 
underlying copyright entitlement. Indeed, some supporters of the DMCA 
have argued that, by facilitating enforcement of copyright entitlements, it 
may facilitate private ordering and promote even more efficient 
allocation of property entitlements.156 Thus, whether or not one agrees 
with the substantive content of the law, its underlying regulatory 
approach does not differ too dramatically from the property-rights model. 
 In other respects, however, the DMCA represents a departure from 
the property rights model. In particular, the DMCA, taking a page from 
the AHRA, is more willing to intervene in the technology markets.157 By 
banning certain technologies from public distribution, the DMCA again 
affects the market for technology.158 More significantly, the DMCA 
departs from the property-rights view insofar as it expressly gives the 
Librarian of Congress, for the first time, not only power over the terms 
                                                                  
153 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C). 
154 17 U.S.C. § 1202. 
155 See, e.g., Litman, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT, supra note 3; Glynn Lunney, Jr., The Death of 
Copyright: Digital Technology, Private Copying, and the Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act, 87 VA. L. REV. 813 (2001); cf. Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the 
Digital Economy: Why the Anti-Circumvention Regulations Need to be Revised, 14 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 519 (1999). 
156 See Tom Bell, Fair Use vs. Fared Use: The Impact of Automated Rights Management 
on Copyright’s Fair Use Doctrine, 76 N.C. L. REV. 557 (1998); I. Trotter Hardy, 
Property (And Copyright) In Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 217 (1996); but see 
Julie Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy of “Rights 
Management”, 97 MICH. L. REV. 462 (1998); Yochai Benkler, An Unhurried View of 
Private Ordering in Information Transactions, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2063 (2000); Mark 
Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property (forthcoming 
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157 See Benton J. Gaffney, Copyright Statutes That Regulate Technology: A Comparative 
Analysis Of The Audio Home Recording Act And The Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 
75 WASH. L. REV. 611 (2000).  
158 On the other hand, the ban on technology may not be all that different, at least from a 
regulatory perspective, from the ban that might result from an application of contributory 
or vicarious liability. See, e.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th 
Cir. 2001). So it is possible to argue that this aspect is not all that different from the 
property rights view. 
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and conditions of compulsory licenses, but actual substantive rule-
making power.159 The DMCA delegates to the Librarian of Congress the 
power, after notice and comment, to exempt categories of works from the 
anticircumvention provisions entirely. In crafting such exemptions, the 
Librarian of Congress is directed to consider various statutory factors, 
including the availability of the copyrighted works for various nonprofit, 
preservation, and educational purposes; the impact of the 
anticircumvention provisions on criticism, comment, teaching, news 
reporting, scholarship; the effect of circumvention on the market for or 
value of copyrighted works; and any other factors that the Office 
considers appropriate.  
 The Librarian of Congress conducted the first such rulemaking two 
years after enactment of the DMCA and, after extensive notice and 
comment, exempted two categories of works. Three years later, the 
Librarian again conducted the rulemaking and exempted four such 
categories.160 In each case, the Librarian published notice of the proposed 
rulemaking. Many proposed exemptions, and even more comments, were 
submitted. The Librarian of Congress also held hearings, at which parties 
could testify in support of, or against, various proposed exemptions. And 
in each case, the Librarian issued its regulations, along with a response to 
these comments articulating the reasons for its regulations.161 
 Thus, the DMCA very expressly adopts a regulatory approach in 
vesting the Librarian of Congress with rulemaking authority. Rather than 
leaving the development of exemptions to the courts, via an equitable 
defense akin to fair use, the DMCA expressly chose to vest such 
authority in an administrative body. Moreover, the function of the 
Librarian of Congress in this capacity appears to differ relatively little 
from the way similar agencies engage in rulemaking in other substantive 
areas. Thus, the DMCA is notable for this particular innovation in 
regulatory approach, and may signal a willingness on the part of 
Congress to move even further toward a regulatory model. 
 
5. Broadcast Flag 
 
                                                                  
159 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C). 
107th Congress, 1st Session (December 12-13, 2001) on Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act (DMCA) Section 104 Report. 
160 The four categories include: (1) compilations of blocked internet sites found in 
internet filtering software; (2) computer programs protected by physical access control 
mechanisms, where access is impaired due to malfunction or obsolescence; (3) computer 
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38 REGULATORY COPYRIGHT  April 26, 2004 
[Insert discussion]. 
 
6. Future Proposals 
 
 Finally, many current proposals for further amending or reforming 
the Copyright Act have also adopted a more regulatory approach. First, 
at least one recent bill proposed by Senator Ernest Hollings would have 
intervened even more extensively in technology markets than the 
DMCA. The Hollings bill, proposed in 2002, would have mandated that 
every device capable of playing digital content contain technology to 
prevent unauthorized copying.162 Thus, even general purpose digital 
devices, such as computers, would have had to implement copy-
protection or access-control technology. This would have intervened far 
more intrusively into the development of the computer and consumer 
electronics industries. Those industries successfully banded together with 
consumers to defeat the proposed legislation.163 
 A number of academics have also advanced very detailed proposals 
to significantly revamp copyright law in light of the challenges presented 
by digital technology. Specifically, these scholars have advanced 
proposals for replacing the existing entitlement structure for digital 
media with a compulsory license or levy, similar to the levy found in the 
AHRA.164 In each case, the proposals would permit certain consumer 
copying of digital content free from copyright liability. However, a levy 
would be placed on certain related materials (e.g. computers, media) or 
activities (e.g. downloading, ISP access) to compensate copyright 
owners. The basic impetus behind these proposals is a concern that 
enforcement difficulties are rendering the existing entitlement structure 
untenable, and a desire to take full advantage of the increased 
dissemination possibilities provided by digital technology. 
 These proposals are, in many ways, a logical extension of the 
regulatory trend in copyright law over the past several years. The 
proposals expressly adopt aspects of prior amendments, such as the 
existing compulsory licenses and the levy under the AHRA. They then 
extend these features to cover, not just a limited slice of the copyright 
                                                                  
162 S. 2048, 107th Cong. (2002). 
163 Note many past proposed compulsory licenses.  E.g. lending, home taping, etc. 
164 See Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Creative Destruction Of Copyright: Napster And The 
New Economics Of Digital Technology, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 263 (2002), Glynn Lunney, 
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markets, but large portions of the copyright markets. They thus replace 
the property-rights approach with a purely regulatory approach. In each 
of these cases, the government’s involvement in the shape and scope of 
the copyright markets would be far more extensive than with an industry-
neutral, property-rights model. 
 
D. COMPARATIVE SCOPE 
 
 The regulatory approach to copyright law, as defined in the 
beginning of this Part, has thus established itself firmly as an alternative 
to the older, industry-neutral, court-administered property rights model. 
Although many parts of the 1976 Act still retain, at their core, a property-
rights model, other parts of the 1976 Act, along with recent amendments, 
have adopted the competing regulatory approach, with its increased 
detail, greater industry-specificity, willingness to intervene in market 
structure (through imposition of compulsory licenses and express 
regulation of technology), and greater substantive role on the part of the 
Librarian of Congress. 
 What this means in practice is that the impact of the copyright laws 
now varies quite a bit depending upon the industry. For example, the 
publishing (books, newspapers, magazines, etc.) and fine arts industries 
remain largely governed by the property-rights model. The rights are set 
forth rather straightforwardly in the statute and the market is responsible 
for organizing production of creative works in light of the entitlement 
structure. Other industries, such as software, are somewhat more affected 
by the regulatory turn, but still operate largely under the basic property 
entitlement. 
 By contrast, other industries are subject to far greater regulatory 
oversight. Thus, the music industry is subject to a complex overlay of 
multiple regulatory regimes.165 The exclusive rights are distributed in a 
non-uniform manner among industry participants (e.g. sound recordings 
vs. musical works). Certain aspects of the industry are subject to 
relatively straightforward compulsory licenses (e.g. cover and jukebox 
licenses). Other aspects of the industry are subject to extremely complex 
statutory licenses (e.g. digital performances of sound recordings). In each 
of these cases, either Congress or the Librarian of Congress is involved 
in setting the rates and terms of various licenses. Still other aspects of the 
industry are subject to regulation in the technology adopted (e.g. AHRA, 
DMCA).  
 Although it is probably too early to say that the regulatory approach 
has supplanted the property-rights approach, the above analysis indicates 
that the regulatory approach is no longer a limited exception to the 
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rule.166 Instead, it is a rather firmly-established alternative to the 
property-rights model. Moreover, more recent copyright legislation has 
evinced a clear willingness to adopt the regulatory approach. Thus, the 
clear trend has been to move more toward a regulatory model for 
copyright.  
 Although many commentators have recognized the increased size 
and complexity of the copyright act,167 the nature and full scope of the 
recent change have not been fully appreciated. Much of the existing 
literature remains focused on the portions of the act that are still 
governed by the property-rights model. Comparatively little literature is 
devoted to those portions that are governed by the regulatory model. 
Similarly, most copyright and intellectual property law casebooks still 
emphasize the property-rights regime, and treat the more regulatory 
portions of the act, if at all, as exceptions to or limited departures from 
the property rights model. This, despite the fact that copyright practice 
has increasingly forced practitioners to deal with these more regulatory 
aspects of the act. 
 In part, this failure to fully appreciate this change may be because the 
shift has been very recent. In part, there may also be an understandable 
reluctance to grapple with the portions of the copyright act that are seen 
as overly complex, narrow in scope, arcane, and painfully (and in some 
cases absurdly) detailed. The property rights model, with its judicial 
opinions and engagement with broad, fundamental copyright principles 
is far more intellectually and aesthetically satisfying. Reading Feist v. 
Rural Telephone or Sony v. Universal is far more enjoyable than reading 
the intricate provisions of the DPRSRA. Yet the future shape of the 
copyright act will, I believe, resemble the DPRSRA more than Feist. In 
many ways, then, this Article is an attempt to force us to recognize that 
these portions are no longer the exceptions but a fundamental and 
important part of the Act.  
  
III.  A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 
 
 This Part undertakes a critical assessment of the shift from a property 
rights approach to a more regulatory approach. It begins by offering a 
number of possible explanations for the shift. It next discusses a number 
of benefits of the current, regulatory approach, in particular the ability to 
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solve perceived market failures and tailor rights and responsibilities in a 
far more detailed fashion. It then focuses on some of the costs of the shift 
to a more regulatory approach. In particular, it focuses on the 
comparative lack of transparency and the related increased incentive for 
rent-seeking on the part of the regulated industries. It also focuses on the 
current system’s underutilization of empirical data and expertise in 
setting copyright policy. These findings form the basis of the 
recommendations in the following part. 
 
A. WHY THE SHIFT? 
  
 It is interesting to speculate about why copyright law has shifted 
from a property-rights approach to a more regulatory approach. Although 
this Article does not purport to set forth the definitive reason, here are a 
couple of possibilities. First, much of the increased complexity of the 
copyright code can probably be attributed to the increased complexity of 
the subject matter. The initial copyright act regulated an extremely 
limited set of works, namely books, charts, and maps. Thus, a simple 
entitlement was generally sufficient to deal with the relatively simple 
markets involved. By contrast, today’s copyright act must regulate the 
vast subject matter encompassed by modern copyright law, including 
such diverse types of works as books, newspapers, magazines, fine art, 
movies, recorded music, and computer software.168 In addition, many of 
these industries have been subject to significant challenges as a result of 
changing technologies. Thus one would reasonably expect the copyright 
entitlement to become more complex as the subject matter of regulation 
becomes more complex.169  
 Second, and relatedly, much of the increased complexity may also be 
attributable to the increased importance and value of these markets. 
Where certain property entitlements are of comparatively low value, it 
may not be cost effective to articulate the scope of such entitlements in a 
detailed fashion. However, as property entitlements become more 
valuable, it becomes more worthwhile for the law to define the 
entitlements in a more particularized fashion, whether through legislation 
or litigation.170 The incentive to fine-tune the law increases. By any 
measure, the copyright industries have become economically far more 
significant than they were at the turn of the century. Thus, we might 
                                                                  
168 See 17 U.S.C. § 102. 
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expect the corresponding law to articulate these copyright entitlements in 
a far more detailed manner. 
 Third, the increasing regulatory turn in copyright law may also 
reflect an increasing desire to cure perceived market failures that might 
result from a pure property-rights approach. Many of the complex 
compulsory license schemes can be understood as motivated by this 
concern. With each of the compulsory licenses, the policy question is 
how this departure from the market baseline (and the attendant, non-
trivial administrative costs) can be justified. The argument for the 
compulsory license is that the market would otherwise fail.171 For 
example, in the case of cable re-transmissions, the argument might be 
that transactions costs, the possibility of holdouts, and other strategic 
behavior by copyright owners might make it impossible for cable 
companies to effectively obtain licenses for all of the works that they 
wish to retransmit.172 Or, alternatively, that there might be certain public 
values in access to these materials that would otherwise not be met. 
Thus, the Act substitutes a compulsory license. Similarly, with the 
AHRA or many of the new levy proposals, the claim may be that the 
costs of enforcement with a property rights model are simply too high, 
and that the model must therefore be replaced by an alternative structure. 
This alternative structure is inherently more regulatory than a basic, 
property-rights structure. Thus, the increased use of a regulatory format 
may well indicate both an increased recognition of market failures and an 
increased desire to cure them. 
 Fourth, the increasing regulatory nature of copyright law may result 
in part from the pragmatic need for political compromise on the part of 
entrenched interests.173 The 1976 revision of the copyright act took more 
than 20 years, in part due to the need to balance the interests of many 
competing industries and groups. Given the complexity of the subject 
matter, Congress expressly invited industry groups to participate in the 
drafting of specific provisions of the 1976 Act.174 This had the advantage 
of both injecting much-needed expertise into the policy discussion and 
facilitating the kind of political compromise necessary to pass the act.175 
Some of the resulting statutory provisions, however, resembled the kind 
of detailed deal-making that private parties engage in. Subsequent 
                                                                  
171 But see Merges, Contracting, supra note 61. 
172 See supra Part II.B.3. 
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amendments also resulted from the need to balance the interests of 
competing groups. 
 Finally, and relatedly, the increasing complexity of copyright law 
may also result in part from rent-seeking on the part of the regulated 
industries. In particular, as copyright law becomes more complex, it 
becomes less understandable to general policymakers and the public at 
large.176 Thus, rent-seeking becomes less easy to detect.177 At the same 
time, the increased value and importance of the copyright markets make 
copyright legislation a prime source for rent-seeking by organized 
interests. This is particularly problematic in cases where consumers or 
nascent industries are under-represented.178 Jessica Litman has written 
extensively about the way that the copyright industries were involved 
heavily in the drafting of the 1976 revision to the act, and how 
consumers and future industries were not represented.179 
 It is hard to say which of these factors is primarily responsible for the 
shift. Clearly, the desire to cure perceived market failures has played a 
large role, as can be most easily seen in the case of the cable and satellite 
compulsory licenses. Thus to some extent, the regulatory turn reflects the 
need for more interventionist techniques in achieving a more finely-
tuned copyright balance.180 At the same time, this does not completely 
explain the passage of the AHRA, DPRSRA or the DMCA, where the 
case for, and evidence of, market failure was far weaker. Nor does this 
explanation completely account for the specific ways in which some of 
these provisions were enacted. Thus, in the end, it is probably safe to say 
that the increasing regulatory turn is the result of a complex mix of 
factors. 
 In a broader sense, copyright law is experiencing, albeit at a much 
later date, the same response to complexity that has characterized other 
areas of federal law.181 The dramatic rise of the federal administrative 
state during the first half of this century reflected a recognition of the 
limits of statutory and common-law lawmaking in the face of the 
complexities of modern society. Accordingly, in many other areas of 
federal law, Congress recognized the practical need to delegate authority 
to administrative agencies, as a way of injecting both expertise and 
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flexibility into the regulatory process. This same recognition has arrived 
later in the context of copyright law, due to the relatively recent dramatic 




 Whatever the reasons for the change, this shift to a more regulatory 
approach has had some concrete advantages in the context of copyright 
law. First, it has permitted greater tailoring of the copyright code to the 
specifics of particular industries. One criticism of the industry-neutral 
property-based approach has been that it neglects important differences 
in the copyright markets. For example, the market for computer software 
is very different from the market for fine-art photography, which in turn 
is very different from the market for recorded music. Although the courts 
have, in application of the law, adapted copyright law doctrines to take 
some account of these differences,182 there is a practical limit on the 
extent to which this is possible. For example, the long term of copyright 
protection makes little economic sense in the software context, yet courts 
can do little about this.183 Industry-specific enactments thus hold out the 
potential for better tailoring of the act in order to further the purposes of 
the copyright act.184 
 Second, the regulatory approach has, in many instances, provided 
greater clarity to the regulated parties. The detailed statutory exemptions 
from liability,185 for example, provide far more guidance to parties about 
what they can and cannot do with copyrighted works. Although the fair 
use defense has played a significant role in setting the copyright balance, 
it is notoriously fuzzy in application.186 Outcomes in fair use cases are 
difficult to predict with any certainty. The detailed exemptions thus 
provide clear guidance.187 Similarly, the compulsory license provisions, 
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although extremely complex, provide a very detailed roadmap, which the 
regulated industries can follow with some certainty. All else being equal, 
greater clarity encourages legitimate behavior and reduces disputes and 
costs of enforcement.188 
 Third, the regulatory approach may have cured market failures in 
particular industries. The common justification for compulsory licenses, 
for example, is that absent such licenses, the market would fail due to 
transactions costs and other impediments to bargaining. Thus, if we are 
concerned about curing the market failure, we often must engage in more 
significant forms of intervention in the market. For example, in the case 
of the cable broadcast compulsory license, Congress was concerned that 
it would be practically impossible for the cable companies to secure 
licenses from all of the copyright owners of the shows that were included 
on broadcast television.189 The transactions costs and the potential for 
hold-outs were too great. Thus, the compulsory license permitted cable 
companies to broadcast those stations (thus ultimately serving the public 
and increasing competition), while compensating the underlying 
copyright owners.  The merits of this argument have been extensively 
debated elsewhere,190 and this is not the place to revisit that debate, other 
than simply to note that this is another potential benefit of the regulatory 
approach. 
 Fourth and finally, the more detailed regulatory approach may have 
made it practically easier for changes to be made in the law. As 
mentioned above, the 1976 revision of the Act took more than 20 years, 
largely because of the wide array of interests implicated by the revision. 
In order to secure passage of the Act, Congress sought the direct 
involvement of the regulated industries in the drafting and negotiating of 
various parts of the statute.191 Many of the detailed provisions in the Act 
were perceived as necessary to secure agreement on the act. Thus, 
although this contributed to the complexity of the Act, in some sense the 
complexity was necessary if there was to be a revision to the Act in the 
first place.192 Thus, as a pragmatic matter, one benefit of the regulatory 
approach is that it may facilitate the type of political compromise 
necessary to make changes to the law. Moreover, as the prospect of 
another wholesale revision of the Copyright Act grows dimmer, this type 
of complex political compromise may be the only way to effect change 
in the future. 
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1. General Disadvantages 
 
 Although there are clear advantages to the regulatory approach, there 
are also a number of disadvantages. Some of these are general 
disadvantages associated with the approach as a whole, while others are 
specific to the way it has been implemented in the context of copyright 
law. The first and most obvious disadvantage is complexity. The 
regulatory approach has, as implemented in the copyright context, made 
copyright law far more complex. For example, the provisions of the 
DPRSRA are extremely complicated.193 Although detailed provisions 
may be clearer and easier to follow in one sense (thus reducing legal 
ambiguity), they may at the same time be more difficult to understand, as 
industry participants must wade through many detailed statutory 
provisions to find answers. This is especially a problem when the law 
applies to those who do not have the benefit of legal counsel.194 The 
regulatory approach may thus operate in some cases as a barrier to entry 
by new market participants. 
 Another potential cost of complexity is that it may make the 
underlying policy goals of copyright less transparent. Under a simpler, 
judge-administered entitlement structure, the policies underlying 
copyright law are front and center, as courts are required to articulate the 
reasons for their decisions and are forced to grapple with these 
underlying policies in applying the broad terms of the statute to 
particular cases. Under the regulatory approach, however, it sometimes 
becomes more difficult to detect the underlying policies in the thicket of 
complex provisions. Indeed, in some cases, there may be no underlying 
policy at all, and the provision may only be explainable as the result of 
interest group bargaining.195 Thus, copyright law may become less 
visibly tethered to underlying policy goals. Courts may also find it easier 
to defer to Congress or interpret statutory terms literally in the absence of 
strong signals about the underlying policies.196 Judge Pierre Leval, for 
                                                                  
193 See supra, Part II.C.3. 
194 For example, small webcasters were forced to deal with the extremely complex 
provisions of the DPRSRA. See Loren, Untangling, supra note 7. 
195 For example, the lack of a public performance right for sound recordings finds little if 
any support in copyright policy, and can only be explained as the result of raw interest 
group pressure. See Loren, Untangling, supra note 7. 
196 Compare the approaches adopted by the courts in Sega Enterp. Ltd. v. Accolade, 997 
F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992) (interpreting fair use broadly in light of policies) and Universal 
City Studios v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001) (interpreting DMCA exemptions 
very narrowly). 
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example, has lamented the diminished role of the courts in developing 
copyright policy.197 
 Increased complexity and lack of conceptual coherence may also 
increase the incentive and opportunities for rent-seeking by the affected 
industries. Where the statute is relatively simple, departures from a 
property-based structure and its underlying principles are more visible. 
So, for example, when the player piano industry was subject to a 
compulsory license, this departure from the property-based model was 
quite clear.198 By contrast, where a statute is far more complex and 
encumbered by special provisions, it is easier for the regulated parties to 
seek favorable treatment in the complexities of the code.199 Thus, it may 
be more difficult to detect and oppose these examples of favorable 
treatment.200 
 
2. Disadvantages as Currently (Partially) Implemented 
 
 In addition to the general problems above, there have been problems 
with the implementation of the regulatory approach in the specific 
context of copyright law. In other areas of federal law involving complex 
statutes, Congress often gives an administrative agency the authority to 
administer the federal statute. Under familiar administrative law theory, 
delegation of such authority to an agency takes advantage of the 
agency’s greater expertise and flexibility, as compared to Congress.201 
Thus agencies often play a significant role in areas involving complex 
federal enactments, whether through rulemaking, enforcement, or 
adjudication. 
 Unlike these other areas, agency involvement – specifically the 
Librarian of Congress’s involvement – in administering the Copyright 
Act, though increasing, has historically been more limited and has not 
kept pace with the complexity of the Copyright Act. As described above, 
                                                                  
197 See Leval, supra note 56 (under the new approach, “[i]nterpretation must hew as 
closely as possible to a statute's most literal terms, no matter how senseless such a 
reading may be”); Jon O. Newman, Between Legal Realism and Neutral Principles: The 
Legitimacy of Institutional Values, 72 Cal. L. Rev. 200, 209 (1984) (noting own tendency 
to interpret complex and specific statutes more literally). 
198 See Rai, supra note 177, at 1130 (suggesting that detailed statutory departures from 
baseline property rights model reflect rent-seeking) (“Even though Congress has 
generally avoided fleshing out the open- ended language of the patent statute, those 
amendments that have been made appear to reflect wealth transfers to particular 
industries.”). 
199 See Menell, Envisioning, supra note 6; See Burk & Lemley, Policy Levers, supra note 
2. But see aborted attempt to make sound recordings works for hire. 
200 This may explain accelerating trend in the complexity of the act. See infra Appendix 
A.  See Menell, Envisioning, supra note 6 (positing this as an explanation). 
201 See, e.g., Davis, supra note 181. 
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the Copyright Office is an arm of the Library of Congress. It thus sits 
under Article I of the constitution, rather than Article II, like the 
executive-branch agencies.202 Moreover, its historical role has been 
limited to registering copyrights and looking after primarily ministerial 
tasks associated with registration.203 It was never intended to serve all of 
the functions of a traditional executive-branch agency. True, in recent 
years, Congress has begun to give it more power – some rate-making, 
adjudicatory, and limited rulemaking authority. And the Copyright 
Office has certainly played an important role in advising Congress on 
issues of copyright policy more generally. However, the Copyright 
Office’s role is comparatively more limited than the role of other 
agencies. This reflects the fact that we are still in the process of making 
the transition from a property-rights regime to a regulatory regime. 
 Because of the lack of strong agency involvement, the 
implementation of the regulatory approach in the context of copyright 
suffers from additional flaws and fails to take full advantage of the 
potential benefits of a fully regulatory approach. First, copyright law 
does not currently take full advantage of the potential expertise offered 
by an administrative agency. The Copyright Office’s role, though 
increasing, is still limited. The vast bulk of its rulemaking authority 
relates to non-substantive issues like registration. And although it reports 
to Congress on issues of policy, these reports are purely advisory.204 
Thus, its ability to directly apply its expertise is limited. Moreover, the 
Copyright Office does not have as much expertise on this front as it 
potentially could. Most of the staff of the office remains concerned with 
the ministerial tasks the Office is charged with.205 The office thus lacks 
the economic and technological expertise that would make it an even 
more effective source for informed copyright policy. 
 Second, and even more problematically, regulatory copyright, as 
currently implemented, lacks sufficient flexibility. Although the act has 
increased in complexity and detail, most of these provisions have largely 
been hard-wired into the copyright statute. Thus, these provisions are 
potentially much more difficult to alter. This is particularly problematic 
in light of the dynamic nature of current copyright markets, faced as they 
are with dramatic technological change.206 Anchoring detailed provisions 
                                                                  
202 Note, however, that the Librarian is appointed by the President, subject to 
confirmation by the Senate. Eltra Corp. v. Ringer, 579 F.2d 294, 300 (4th Cir. 1978). For 
a more extensive discussion of the constitutional implications of the Copyright Office’s 
role, see infra note 262. 
203 See supra Part I.B. 
204 See 17 U.S.C. § 701. 
205 See Copyright Office Org. Chart <http://www.copyright.gov/docs/c-711.pdf>. 
206 See Merges, One Hundred Years, supra note 5; Rai, supra note 177, at 1128 (making 
similar point about patent law and innovation). 
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in a statute risks making these provisions inapplicable. One concrete 
example is the AHRA, in which Congress assumed that most personal 
copying of recorded music would be done by dedicated digital audio tape 
decks.207 This assumption turned out to be mistaken, as most consumers 
turned to multi-purpose computer equipment. However, because the 
AHRA was based on the earlier assumption, it was not written to apply 
to multi-purpose computer equipment,208 and as a result, the statute is 
largely irrelevant today. The more recent DPRSRA may be another 
example of this. 
 Thus, even within the regulatory approach, there are significant 
problems with the way it has been implemented. In many ways, the 
current situation represents the worst of both worlds. In its most recent 
enactments, Congress has passed extremely detailed, highly specific 
provisions without the benefit of the flexibility and expertise that could 
be provided by an administrative agency. And although Congress is at 
least in theory more representative and responsive to the public than an 
administrative agency, its dependence upon regulated industries for 
expertise and data has made it less responsive to the public at large. The 
result has been legislation that systematically favors the industries being 
regulated. 
 
IV.  SOME IMPLICATIONS 
 
 This Part of the Article begins to suggest some directions for reform, 
in light of the analysis above. First, the strengths and weaknesses 
analyzed above suggest guidelines for when a regulatory approach might, 
at least in theory, be preferable to a property-rights based approach. 
Applied specifically to existing copyright law, this suggests that the 
regulatory approach might be appropriate for the cable and satellite 
industries, but not appropriate for areas involving digital technology. 
Thus, ideally, copyright law would return to a more property-rights based 
approach in the latter instance. As a practical matter, however, it is 
unlikely that we will see a return to a simpler form of regulation. The 
most we can hope for is a refusal to keep extending this approach to new 
areas of digital copyright.  
 This conclusion leads to the second set of proposals. If much of 
existing copyright law will remain under the regulatory approach, then 
there are a number of ways in which the functioning of this approach can 
be improved. Once we acknowledge that copyright has become more 
                                                                  
207 See supra Part II.C.2. 
208 See Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc. 180 F.3d 1072 
(9th Cir. 1999).  
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regulatory and that this aspect of copyright law is here to stay, then it 
behooves us to think more carefully about how to properly administer a 
complex statutory framework. Taking the regulatory approach seriously 
suggests, among other things: granting the Copyright Office or some 
other similar agency greater rulemaking authority in order to flexibly 
adapt copyright law to changing circumstances; giving the Copyright 
Office sufficient resources and expertise to undertake this task; and 
ensuring that the process is as open to public comment as possible. 
 
A. WHEN TO DEPLOY 
  
 The analysis in the previous part of the Article suggests some 
tentative guidelines about when a regulatory approach might be preferred 
over a property-rights approach. For example, where there is good data 
for a particular industry, where the main participants in that industry are 
easily-identifiable and well-represented, and where a particular market 
failure is well-defined, a regulatory approach may have significant 
advantages. It would provide greater guidance and specificity to the 
regulated industries. The rules would be based on some industry 
experience and more concrete data. The risks of being locked into a 
suboptimal regime would be reduced. Furthermore, most of the industry 
participants would be relatively well-established and able to represent 
themselves in the political process. Under these conditions, the 
regulatory approach would permit a more finely-tuned copyright balance 
of access and incentives to create and reflect more accurately the full 
range of interests. 
 By contrast, where there is significant doubt over both technology 
and/or the future structure of the market, where there are new entrants, 
and where the case for market failure is less clear, a property-based 
model may be preferable.209 In such cases, there will be inadequate 
information about the technology and/or market upon which to base 
highly-detailed legislation. As a result, the risk of locking into a poor 
regulatory framework will be greater. Moreover, the danger exists that 
existing market actors may act in ways that harm future potential market 
participants, who are not yet identified and do not yet have seats at the 
table. In such cases, it may be preferable to set a broad entitlement and 
wait for better information before intervening more significantly into the 
structure of the market.210 
                                                                  
209 See Edward Lee, Rules And Standards For Cyberspace, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1275 
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 Applying these guidelines to specific copyright industries, this 
suggests that a regulatory framework might well be quite appropriate for 
the cable and satellite industries. In these cases, the theoretical case for 
market failure was relatively clear.211 Thus regulation could be targeted 
specifically to addressing the market failure. Although these industries 
were relatively new at the time of the legislation, they were large and 
reasonably well-represented in Congress. Accordingly, less risk existed 
that legislation might systematically disregard the interests of certain 
market actors. Moreover, both industries had already been subject to 
extensive regulation under general communications law. Accordingly, 
the cost of complexity of a regulatory structure was not as 
burdensome.212  
 Conversely, the guidelines suggest that a regulatory approach may be 
quite ill-suited to issues involving digital copyright.213 Here, the case for 
market failure is not at all clear.214 Much debate persists over whether the 
existing property rights structure can accommodate the new technology. 
Both the technology and market structure are too ill-defined and are still 
too much in flux. No one quite knows how the industry will shake out in 
response to the dramatic changes in computer and network technology. 
Participants in the market, both large and small, are still entering and 
exiting. No good data exists, and Congress is not equipped with the 
requisite expertise (whether technological or economic) to make 
informed decisions on this front. Enacting detailed legislation at this 
point risks locking the law into a structure that may ultimately not be 
desirable. As already noted above, the AHRA was a clear example of 
this.215 
 The recent ratemaking proceeding under the DPRSRA illustrates the 
types of difficulties listed above.216 As an initial matter, it is unclear 
whether detailed legislation was even necessary.217 Moreover, the 
                                                                  
211 See supra Part II.B.2. But see Maureen A. O'Rourke, Bargaining In The Shadow Of 
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“compulsory licenses cannot be explained simply as transaction cost savings devices; 
they were all intended at least in part to regulate rates of remuneration”). 
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Librarian of Congress was charged with setting the compulsory license 
rate for certain internet webcasts of copyrighted sound recordings. The 
statute required the Librarian to set the rate to closely mimic what the 
market would have set it at, in the absence of the compulsory license. 
Because the webcasting industry was so new, however, almost no actual 
data existed to help the Librarian make this determination. Moreover, an 
extremely wide range of existing and potential parties (both large and 
small) were involved in the ratemaking proceeding. The result was a 
lengthy and extremely costly proceeding. And in the end, the Librarian 
based its rate on a single negotiated license between the RIAA and 
Yahoo.com.218 
 Similarly, the anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA exhibited 
misunderstandings about the nature of the technology being regulated.219 
In particular, Congress enacted a ban on acts of circumvention and on the 
distribution of certain anti-circumvention technologies, at a time when 
such technologies had yet to be fully developed or marketed. 
Accordingly, the precise applicability of some of the statutory terms to 
actual technologies is not at all clear.220 Commentators have documented 
other ways in which the DMCA has resulted in unintended 
consequences.221 In the end, the above analysis suggests that a more 
modest, open-ended entitlement structure might be preferable where an 
industry is new, and technology and the market are still evolving. 
 In this respect, the experience of patent law may serve as a useful 
basis for comparison. The subject matter of patent law, innovation, 
reflects, if anything, a need for even greater respect for the potential 
impact of technological change. Yet patent law has thus far largely 
resisted efforts at greater statutory specification or intervention into the 
market, relying instead on a relatively industry-neutral property 
entitlement.222 Moreover, commentators in the field have expressly 
                                                                                                                                                   
2004) (arguing that private collective rights organizations could have satisfied licensing 
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argued for continued adherence to this model, pointing expressly to 
copyright as a cautionary tale.223  
 Thus, ideally, Congress would replace the complex regulatory 
framework found in the area of digital content with a simpler entitlement 
structure.224 In the context of digital music, for example, Lydia Loren has 
suggested scrapping the multiple, overlapping statutory regimes, and 
replacing them with a far simpler entitlement for both musical works and 
sound recordings.225 Indeed, the Register of Copyright herself has 
recently suggested the possibility of abolishing certain compulsory 
licenses for recorded music.226 Much of the existing regulatory structure 
is the historical result of various political compromises, largely 
untethered from underlying substantive support. Replacing the existing, 
complex statutory structure would give industry participants far more 
flexibility in structuring the market in response to changes in technology 
and consumer demand.227 
 The chances of this actually happening, however, are rather low. It is 
rare that Congress reaches out to make legislation simpler. As the 
analysis in the previous sections has indicated, the trend in copyright law 
has been in exactly the opposite direction, and there are a number of 
reasons why that has been the case.228 Given that these detailed 
provisions were hammered out by the relevant industries, revisiting them 
would be politically very difficult.229 Thus, these provisions are, for 
practical purposes, probably here to stay.230  
                                                                  
223 See Rai, supra note 177, 1130 (“The perils of legislative action in the area of 
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 At the very least, however, Congress should be reluctant to extend 
this regulatory approach (at least in its current, inflexible form) to other 
areas involving digital technology. Congress should thus be reluctant to 
enact the more recently proposed bills, such as the Hollings bill, that 
would intervene into the structure and details of the digital copyright 
markets. Again, the basic idea is that we currently do not have sufficient 
information about future technology or market structures, and a more 
neutral property entitlement would provide greater flexibility and permit 
the parties to organize the production of copyrighted works flexibly. 
 The analysis here also casts doubt on the many levy proposals that 
some commentators have advanced as a response to the problem of 
digital copying.231 As discussed above, these proposals push the degree 
of intervention to the next level,232 requiring the government to more 
extensively regulate both the relevant copyright industries and related 
consumer electronics and services industries. An extensive discussion of 
the merits of these proposals is beyond the scope of this Article. At the 
very least, however, the analysis in this Article suggests that the 
increasingly regulatory nature of these proposals should be a significant 
consideration in assessing their merits. 
 More generally, the analysis suggests that Congress should be more 
selective in applying and extending the regulatory approach to new 
situations. Now that the institutional structure to support a regulatory 
approach has been created, the temptation exists to unthinkingly apply 
this structure to new situations, without adequately assessing the costs 
and benefits. The analysis above suggests that Congress should be more 
conscious of the various regulatory tools it has at its disposal, and to 
more carefully consider which tools may be appropriate for a given 
situation, based on the considerations set forth above. 
 
B. HOW TO IMPROVE 
 
 Given that regulatory copyright is here to stay, the next question is 
how we can improve upon it. As discussed above, the regulatory 
approach to copyright has been implemented without taking full 
advantage of its potential benefits. This suggests that an opportunity 
exists for the function of regulatory copyright to be improved. How 
might copyright look if we took the regulatory approach seriously and 
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applied the familiar insights that have been gleaned from other areas of 
administrative law? More specifically, how might the function of 
regulatory copyright be improved to increase the possibility of sound 
copyright policies and accurately reflect the interests of the full range of 
participants? 
 
1. Substantive Rulemaking Authority 
 
 First, the analysis above indicates that the Copyright Office, or some 
other appropriate agency, should be given greater substantive authority to 
regulate in areas involving complex and dynamic issues. One traditional 
justification for agency involvement has been the greater expertise that 
an agency can bring to bear on a complex issue.233 Thus, Congress 
delegates to the EPA the authority to make complex decisions involving 
environmental policy because it is better equipped to weigh the complex 
scientific and economic arguments involved in such decisions. Another 
justification has been that regulation is comparatively more flexible than 
legislation, and can therefore better respond to changing 
circumstances.234 Thus, the EPA can subsequently revisit issues if the 
underlying facts or science have changed in the interim. 
 The Copyright Office’s regulatory authority has historically been 
limited to issues relating to its ministerial functions, such as registration 
and deposit. However, the recent trend, as demonstrated above, has been 
to give the Office ever more regulatory authority, and the analysis here 
suggests that this trend could be formalized and made more express. 
Since 1976, the Office has exercised rulemaking power in connection 
with its administration of compulsory licenses.235 It has also taken on a 
more robust role conducting studies and advising Congress on copyright 
policy. And more recently, it has it been given limited substantive 
rulemaking authority, in crafting exemptions to the DMCA.236 
 These expansions of regulatory authority suggest that the Copyright 
Office is potentially equipped to take on a more active regulatory role, 
where warranted. For example, the Copyright Office has conducted two 
rulemakings under its DMCA authority.237 It has accepted and responded 
to public comments and has issued regulations. Although there has been 
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much debate over these exemptions,238 the process itself functioned 
relatively well.239 It permitted more public input into the policymaking 
process, via its notice and comment proceeding, than parties otherwise 
would have had before Congress. It permitted the Copyright Office to 
apply its expertise directly to the issue, rather than indirectly, via a report 
to Congress. And even though the Copyright Office ultimately rejected 
many of the comments, it issued a written report responding to each 
comment and articulating its reasons. Finally, and perhaps most 
importantly, the process permitted the Copyright Office to adjust the law 
as conditions in this very dynamic market changed.240 While perhaps not 
perfect, the process had these concrete benefits. 
 The DMCA rulemaking process thus suggests that Congress might 
consider increasing and formalizing the level of substantive discretion 
given to the Copyright Office in certain areas. With specific respect to 
the DMCA rulemaking, much frustration with the process had to do with 
the Copyright Office’s limited interpretation of the scope of the statutory 
grant of authority to craft exemptions.241 The statute stated that the Office 
could exempt “classes of works” for which access was reduced, and the 
Office plausibly interpreted this provision to mean that it could not 
exempt specific uses of works. The Office thus rejected many proposals 
that were, in its view, use-specific. Granting the Office greater authority 
would have permitted the Office to respond more dynamically to 
changing technologies. 
 Similarly, the DMCA would have benefited from extension of 
rulemaking authority regarding many of the exemptions to anti-
circumvention liability.242 Although the exemptions were intended to 
provide some breathing space for legitimate activities, they have in 
practice provided less such breathing space than initially thought.243 This 
is not unexpected, given that Congress was legislating here in the 
absence of concrete information about what these technologies would 
look like. Although the courts may cure some of these problems in the 
application of the statute, the cases thus far suggest that they will be 
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deferential to Congressional findings and reluctant to read in broad 
changes to the highly-specific text of the statute. 244 
 Granting the Copyright Office greater authority over these 
exemptions would have enabled greater flexibility and would have 
reduced the costs of these unintended consequences. Although Congress 
quite clearly made the conscious choice not to give courts the wide-
ranging discretion to craft exemptions, giving such authority to the 
Copyright Office would have at least built in some flexibility while 
exerting greater control over discretion. Rulemaking thus presents an 
intermediate step, between those two extremes. 
 At the same time, giving the Office regulatory authority over 
exemptions would also have established a mechanism through which the 
regulated parties could seek clarification of the statute, rather than 
waiting for judicial decisions, which have been slow in coming. Another 
complaint frequently leveled at the exemptions is the vagueness of their 
terms.245 In particular, encryption researchers have argued that the 
exemptions subject them to much uncertainty, thereby chilling legitimate 
research. A number of threatened cases against researchers indicate that 
this threat is not illusory.246 At the same time, clarification from the 
courts has not been forthcoming. Providing a regulatory mechanism 
would permit parties to affirmatively seek clarification, rather than 
waiting for a judicial decision.  
 A similar approach could be extended to other areas. The AHRA, for 
example, would have benefited from a more flexible approach. Had 
Congress granted the copyright office more authority to adapt the law 
more flexibly to changing technology, the AHRA might not have 
become a dead letter.247 Similarly, the DPRSRA could have made greater 
use of the expertise and flexibility of the Copyright Office. Currently, the 
Copyright Office’s role has been largely limited to administering the 
CARP rate-setting process, which has been a significant undertaking. 
Congress could, however, have also given the Librarian of Congress 
greater discretion over the substantive provisions of the DPRSRA itself. 
This would have reduced the complexity of the act and, at the same time, 
built a degree of flexibility into the substantive provisions of the 
DPRSRA, to permit the law to adapt to the dynamic and changing 
market environment. Indeed, the Register of Copyrights has recently 
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testified regarding her limited regulatory ability to address substantive 
problems with the Act.248 
 There are some indications that Congress is already moving down 
this path. The DMCA rulemaking is one example. Moreover, certain 
recent bills in Congress have indicated a greater willingness on the part 
of Congress to delegate such authority to the Copyright Office. For 
example, in introducing the Musical Licensing Reform Act of 1996, 
which would have given the Copyright Office discretion to define the 
terms of an exemption, Senator Orrin Hatch expressly noted that the 
Copyright Office was better placed to set these terms and to change them 
over time in response to changing circumstances.249 Future proposed 
bills, such as database legislation, might also benefit from the additional 
flexibility and expertise offered by an administrative approach.250 
 In many ways, this trend should not be surprising. As copyright law 
begins to intervene more deeply into the structure of complex and 
dynamic markets, we would expect and want more authority to be 
delegated to an administrative agency, just as is the case in other areas of 
complex federal law. The history of copyright itself nicely tracks this 
progression. The first compulsory license set the royalty rate inflexibly in 
the statute, and left it unchanged for several decades. More recent 
compulsory licenses have built in flexibility by permitting administrative 
bodies to adjust and set the rates. The next logical step is to grant 
increasing discretion, not just over rates, but also substantive legal 
provisions, as these are also subject to many of the same pressures for 
change. After all, where markets are dynamic, the underlying market 
failures will also likely be dynamic, and a regulatory regime needs to 
have the flexibility to adjust over time. 
                                                                  
248 See Statement Of Marybeth Peters Register Of Copyrights, Before the Subcommittee 
On Courts, The Internet And Intellectual Property Of The House Committee On The 
Judiciary, 108th Congress, 2d Session (March 11, 2004) (“With respect to problems 
involving the requirement that licensees give notice to copyright owners of their intention 
to use the compulsory license, I believe that I have exhausted the limits of my regulatory 
authority with the notice of proposed rulemaking published today. With respect to 
problems involving the scope and treatment of activities covered by the Section 115 
compulsory license, I may soon be able to resolve some of the issues in the pending 
rulemaking on incidental digital phonorecord deliveries, but it seems clear that legislation 
will be necessary in order to create a truly workable solution to all of the problems that 
have been identified.”). 
249 See 142 Cong. Rec. S2192, S2192-93 (daily ed. Mar. 15, 1996) (statement of Sen. 
Hatch) ("The Copyright Office is in a much better position than Congress to study the 
business practices that prevail in order to identify improvements that would make the 
practices fairer and more efficient."); Marybeth Peters, The Year In Review: 
Accomplishments And Objectives Of The U.S. Copyright Office, 7 FORDHAM INTELL. 
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 25 (1996). 
250 Look at current, proposed digital copyright bills for regulatory content. E.g. Protecting 
Intellectual Property Rights Against Theft and Expropriation Act of 2004, S. 2237. 
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 Of course, there would have to be some substantive limit on the 
amount of discretion granted to the Copyright Office. A blanket 
authorization to “promote the public interest” would certainly shorten the 
existing copyright act, but would entail tremendous administrative costs 
and provide little substantive guidance. Thus, extension of increased 
regulatory authority to the Copyright Office should continue to be 
incremental. However, this type of authority should be expressly 
acknowledged and formalized within the Office, and policymakers 
should be on the lookout for other areas where such a flexible approach 
might usefully be deployed.251 This change would need to be supported 
by additional institutional commitments, as discussed more fully 
below.252 
 
2. Adjudicatory and Enforcement Authority 
 
 The extension of the regulatory model would not necessarily be 
limited to rulemaking. Once we take seriously the idea of the Copyright 
Office as an administrative agency, we open up the possibility of the 
Office taking on both increased adjudicatory and enforcement functions. 
The Copyright Office already has some adjudicatory power. Specifically, 
it hears appeals from denials of registrations.253 More significantly, the 
Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panels have the power to resolve disputes 
between claimants to the proceeds of various compulsory licenses.254 
This latter power has resulted in a number of very involved adjudicatory 
proceedings.255 In these proceedings, the CARPs accept evidence, take 
testimony, rule on motions, and act very much like an adjudicatory body. 
Thus, the Librarian of Congress, through the Copyright Office and 
CARPs, already exercises some adjudicatory authority.  
 Expressly recognizing the regulatory aspects of copyright law would 
lead to greater attention being paid to this adjudicatory function. More 
specifically, the CARPs have come under criticism in recent years. 
Many, including those in the Copyright Office, have criticized the fact 
that the CARPs are ad hoc, and involve the appointment of generalist 
                                                                  
251 Comparative experience of other countries with respect to agency involvement. 
252 Compare Rai, supra note 177, at 1133 (arguing against conferring substantive 
rulemaking authority on PTO, given PTO’s lack of institutional resources and economic 
expertise). 
253 Cite. 
254 17 U.S.C. § 801(b)(3). 
255 See, e.g., In the Matter of Distribution of 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996 and 1997 Cable 
Royalty Funds, Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panel, Docket No. 2000-2, Phase II Cable 
Royalty Distribution Report (April 6, 2001); Distribution of DART Royalty Funds For 
1995, 1996, 1997 and 1998 (Nov. 17, 2000). 
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arbitrators, who must be educated about the issues.256 Recent proposals 
have been made to reform the existing process by returning to more 
permanent tribunals.257 A more permanent recognition of this regulatory 
function would be consistent with the analysis in this Article. 
 Beyond the existing adjudicatory function, there might be additional 
roles that the Copyright Office could fulfill. For example, Mark Lemley 
and Tony Reese have recently advanced an interesting proposal to reduce 
the cost of copyright infringement actions against consumers by giving 
copyright owners access to a low-cost administrative enforcement 
proceeding.258 Although they envision a private arbitration-like structure, 
another possibility might be to enlist the involvement of the Copyright 
Office. Administrative law judges would be able to issue subpoenas and 
decide issues in a low-cost fashion, thereby reducing enforcement costs 
while providing some check on potential abuse of process. Much work 
would still need to be done to assess the viability of such a setup, but the 
basic point is that the Copyright Office could potentially play a role here. 
 Similarly, the Office could be given investigative and enforcement 
authority.259 Although private enforcement of copyright infringement is 
probably the most efficient mechanism, the Office could play a 
constructive role in areas where private enforcement falls short. For 
example, there could be a stronger role for the Copyright Office to deal 
with foreign or off-shore infringement, which is difficult for private 
actors to reach. This would be a logical extension of its current role 
interfacing with foreign countries and international institutions regarding 
copyright policy.260 The Office could also play a greater role in obtaining 
information about infringers from internet service providers. In this way, 
they could reduce the costs of finding infringers while exercising 
appropriate oversight over the privacy interests of the involved parties. 
Although criminal copyright enforcement authority can be exercised by 
local U.S. Attorneys’ Offices, such actions are quite rightly limited to the 
most egregious cases of copyright piracy.261 Some administrative 
                                                                  
256 See Statement of Marybeth Peters Register of Copyrights before the Subcommittee on 
Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property Committee on the Judiciary United States 
House of Representatives, 108th Cong., 1st Sess. (April 1, 2003); Maxey, Note, supra 
note 120. 
257 Copyright Royalty and Distribution Reform Act (H.R. 1417); 
258 Mark Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, Securing Digital Copyright Infringement Without 
Stopping Innovation (forthcoming 2004). 
259 Cf. Protecting Intellectual Property Rights Against Theft and Expropriation Act of 
2004 (S. 2237) (“PIRATE Act”). 
260 17 U.S.C. § 701(b)(3). 
261 Cf. Protecting Intellectual Property Rights Against Theft and Expropriation Act of 
2004 (S. 2237) (“PIRATE Act”) (giving federal government civil copyright enforcement 
authority). 
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enforcement authority by the Copyright Office could fill some of the 
gaps. 
 
3. Increasing Expertise 
 
 The proposals above represent a departure from the Copyright 
Office’s historical role, albeit one that is already in progress. Moreover, 
the advisability of some of these specific proposals depends on the 
specifics of the particular situation, and much additional work would 
need to be done before concluding that they should be implemented. The 
basic point, however, is that once we begin thinking more fully about the 
regulatory nature of existing copyright law, we open up a broader range 
of institutional responses to administer our complex copyright law. This 
Article is less concerned about the specific proposals, and more 
concerned with opening up this area to further consideration.262 
 In order to fulfill an increased policymaking role, some changes 
would need to be made to the Copyright Office’s structure and 
makeup.263 The Copyright Office currently does not have sufficient 
resources or expertise to take on a substantially more robust 
                                                                  
262 An interesting and important question arises about the ability of the Copyright Office 
to constitutionally take on this role. See JeanAne Jiles, Comment, Copyright Protection 
in the New Millennium: Amending the Digital Millennium Copyright Act to Prevent 
Constitutional Challenges, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 443 (2000) (suggesting that DMCA 
rulemaking authority may be unconstitutional); E. Fulton Brylawski, The Copyright 
Office: A Constitutional Confrontation, 44 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 12 (1975). The 
Copyright Office is an arm of the Library of Congress, and the Register of Copyrights is 
appointed by the Librarian of Congress. Although the Library of Congress sits formally 
within the legislative branch, see, e.g., Harry Fox Agency, Inc. v. Mills Music, Inc., 720 
F.2d 733, 736 (2d Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Mills Music v. Snyder, 
469 U.S. 153 (1985); U.S. v. Brooks, 945 F.Supp. 830, 833 (E.D.Pa. 1996) (copyright 
office not an executive “agency” for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 1001), the Librarian of 
Congress is appointed by the President subject to the advice and consent of the Senate. At 
least one federal circuit court has held that the Librarian is an “officer of the United 
States” under Article II, and may therefore exercise rulemaking authority without 
violating separation of powers concerns. See Eltra Corp. v. Ringer, 579 F.2d 294, 300 
(4th Cir. 1978); Raffi Zerounian, Bonneville International V. Peters, 17 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 47 (2002). But see C.H. Dobal, Note, A Proposal To Amend The Cable Compulsory 
License Provisions Of The 1976 Copyright Act, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 699, 720 (1988) 
(arguing that Eltra suspect in light of Bowsher v. Synar). A full discussion of this topic is 
outside the scope of this paper.  However, if the Copyright Office were not 
constitutionally able to take on a more extensive policymaking role, then Congress would 
clearly have to move both existing and future substantive powers to an independent or 
executive agency. 
263 See FY 2004 Budget Request, Statement of Marybeth Peters The Register of 
Copyrights before the Subcommittee on the Legislative Branch Appropriations 
Committee on Appropriations United States Senate, 108th Cong., 1st Sess. (April 10, 
2003) (“As such, our policy and regulatory work in this area is both increasingly 
technical and often contentious.”) 
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policymaking role, not to mention the more significant proposals 
advanced above. A look at the current organizational structure of the 
Office reveals that most of the individuals working in the Office are 
dedicated to the historical functions of that office, namely registration, 
deposit, and other ministerial tasks.264 Comparatively fewer resources are 
devoted to policymaking. Despite this, the Office has done a reasonably 
effective job of fulfilling its policymaking role to date.  
 If the Office is to be expected to engage in a more robust 
policymaking role, however, then the staff would benefit from more 
expertise. Specifically, increased economic expertise would be vital, 
given the economic underpinnings of copyright policy. In addition, as 
copyright law becomes more industry specific, a greater familiarity with 
specific regulated industries would be warranted. Thus, we would expect 
greater specialization within the Copyright Office itself. 
 In addition, copyright law generally, like many other areas of 
intellectual property law, is characterized by insufficient empirical data. 
Such data would be invaluable both for the Office itself and for Congress 
more generally. Moreover, objective data would reduce both the Office’s 
and Congress’s dependency upon the regulated industries for information 
about those industries. The Office could thus play a very constructive 
role in helping to collect and create the kind of empirical data necessary 
for informed copyright policy. While it is true that the Office has already 
played this role in various circumstances,265 additional resources would 
help it fulfill this duty more effectively. 
 Similarly, the Office would benefit from greater technological 
expertise. Copyright markets have been characterized by dramatic 
technological change, and the advent of digital technology has increased 
the rate of change dramatically.266 Greater technical expertise is therefore 
essential for informed policy. For example, much copyright policy 
depends upon assessments of the efficacy of attempts to protect 
copyrighted works via technology. Without technical expertise, the risk 
exists that policy will be made based on faulty assumptions. This Article 
has already detailed several examples where Congress has regulated 
                                                                  
264 See Marybeth Peters, The Year In Review: Accomplishments And Objectives Of The 
U.S. Copyright Office, 7 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 25 (1996) (“The 
bulk of what we do is paperwork: we registered over 700,000 claims in works last year, 
and recorded documents concerning transfers of ownership and security interest, of which 
there were over 17,000 with several hundred thousand titles”). Note that this role is 
increasingly automated. Id. 
265 See, e.g., Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) Section 104 Report, Statement 
of Marybeth Peters The Register of Copyrights before the Subcommittee on Courts, the 
Internet, and Intellectual Property Committee on the Judiciary United States House of 
Representatives, 107th Cong., 1st Sess. (Dec. 12-13, 2001); VARA waiver study. 
266 See Merges, One Hundred Years, supra note 5. 
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based on faulty predictions or assumptions about technology.267 Having 
technologists on staff would increase the possibility of informed 
policymaking. 
 By increasing the expertise of the Copyright Office and granting it 
more substantive authority, these reforms would ideally place more 
emphasis on the Copyright Office as a nexus of coherent copyright 
policymaking. Currently, the existing institutional structure lacks a 
strong, informed, centralized policymaking body. The complexity of 
existing copyright markets makes it difficult for courts to grapple with 
these issues,268 and has increasingly made it difficult even for Congress 
to deal with. And although the Copyright Office has at least some 
expertise, it is, as this Article has argued, underutilized. Thus, the hope 
would be that, by making these changes, at least one institution would 
exist with both the institutional competence and authority to make 
informed, consistent, and rational copyright policy. 
 The increased substantive responsibilities of the Copyright Office 
would have the added benefit of fostering public awareness about 
copyright issues and providing a forum for public debate. Although the 
Copyright Office currently plays this role to some extent (particularly 
with respect to education), increasing its authority and making it a more 
central player in the administration of the copyright scheme would 
permit it to more effectively educate the public on matters of copyright 





  The proposals above are, naturally, subject to a number of potential 
objections. Perhaps most seriously, there may be much understandable 
skepticism about any proposal that gives additional authority to an 
administrative agency. Agencies are of course subject to their own flaws. 
They are conventionally viewed as being far less accountable to the 
public, as administrators are unelected. Thus, there are concerns about 
both legitimacy and responsiveness to the public. In addition, there exists 
the risk that the agency may become captured by the industries being 
regulated.269 And regulation by an agency normally results in even 
                                                                  
267 See supra Parts II.C.2 – II.C.4. 
268 Note that there is no specialized court for copyright cases analogous to the Federal 
Circuit in patent cases.  See Rai, supra note 177 (federal circuit as policymaking body). 
269 See generally George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. EC. & 
MGMT. SCI. 3, 9 (1971); Mancur Olson, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 128 (1971); 
Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL 
INTRODUCTION 44 (1991). 
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greater complexity in the structure of regulation, thereby increasing costs 
and raising barriers to competition. 
 Already, there are some examples of Congress using the regulatory 
process to shield itself from having to make difficult choices. For 
example, the DMCA exemption rulemaking power could be viewed, not 
as a praiseworthy attempt to build in flexibility into a new regulatory 
structure, but as an attempt to give the illusion of flexibility while in fact 
restricting the discretion given to the Librarian of Congress in order to 
further the interests of the copyright industries.270 Similarly, the 
provision in the DMCA requiring the Copyright Office to study the 
impact of the DMCA on encryption research271 is also somewhat suspect, 
in light of the fact that the report was due before the relevant provisions 
of the DMCA were to go into effect.272 Thus, there is a very real danger 
that increasing regulatory oversight may simply exacerbate existing 
problems.273 
 I am quite aware of these drawbacks and therefore make these 
proposals with some hesitancy. Yet there are, I believe, reasons for 
thinking that these objections may not be dispositive.274 While agencies 
are indeed more shielded from the public, there are reasons to believe 
that the Copyright Office in particular would be relatively more 
responsive to the public interest. Part of this is historical. The Copyright 
Office sits within the Library of Congress, and the charge of the Library 
of Congress is rather unique.275 Its goal is the production and 
preservation of knowledge for the greater benefit of the public. This 
charge may have the effect of making the Copyright Office more public-
regarding, certainly more so than an agency that is more closely aligned 
                                                                  
270 See Zimmerman, supra note 238. 
271 See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(g)(5). 
272 See Liu, Encryption Research, supra note 219. 
273 See Zimmerman, supra note 238 (“Faced with forcefully expressed objections from 
the library, research and academic communities to this new form of "paracopyright" 
protection, Congress added a few provisions to the DMCA, ostensibly designed to soften 
the impact of the statute on these users' reasonable needs for access. Unfortunately, 
however, the provisions were designed in such a way that made it doubtful from the 
outset that they would actually be able to deliver much of the relief that was supposedly 
intended.”).  
274 See generally Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of 
Regulated Industries Law, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 1323, 1406 (1998) (“Contrary to the theory 
popular in the late 1960s and early 1970s, agencies do not always behave as the hopeless 
captives of their client industries.”); David B. Spence, Getting Beyond Cynicism: New 
Theories of the Regulatory State: A Public Choice Progressivism, Continued, 87 Cornell 
L. Rev. 397, 436 (2002). 
275 See The Mission and Strategic Priorities of the Library of Congress, FY 1997-2004, 
available at: http://www.loc.gov/ndl/mission.html. 
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with the industries being regulated.276 For example, a Copyright Office 
situated in the Department of Commerce would likely look quite 
different. If a governmental body were to be entrusted with substantive 
copyright policy, it is hard to imagine a more public regarding 
government body than the Library of Congress.277 
 In addition, the track-record of the Copyright Office offers some 
reason for hope. Although subject to much criticism from all sides, the 
Copyright Office has been reasonably public-regarding within the limits 
in which it is operating, and certainly more so than Congress. While it is 
true that in certain of its reports and positions, the Office has expressed 
some sympathy with claims for strong protection,278 in other cases, the 
office has recognized the need for weaker protection and more balance in 
the Copyright Act.279 Moreover, in other areas, the Office has proposed 
reasonable changes that would add to the balance.280 Thus, there may be 
good reason to believe that the Copyright Office would be somewhat 
public regarding. 
 Finally, concrete steps would need to be taken to ensure sufficient 
public input into and control over the regulatory process. The Copyright 
Office should be required to gather public input before engaging in 
substantive policy making. Notice and comment should be taken very 
                                                                  
276 See Pamela Samuelson, Will The Copyright Office Be Obsolete In The Twenty- First 
Century?, 13 CARDOZO ARTS AND ENT. L.J. 55 (1994); Eric Schwartz, The Role Of The 
Copyright Office In The Age Of Information, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 69 (1994). 
Compare Rai, supra note 177, at 1133 (“the PTO appears to have developed an 
institutional culture that treats patentees as "clients" to be served rather than as claimants 
who must present a case for being entitled to a patent”). 
277 Note that this argues against combining w/ PTO.  See proposals.  Comparative 
analysis w/ other IP agencies. 
278 See Hearings on H.R. 989 et al. before the Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual 
Property of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., 230 (1995)  
Statement of Register of Copyrights,  at 158 (testifying in support of copyright term 
extension); Pornography, Technology, and Process: Problems and Solutions on Peer-to-
Peer Networks, Statement of Marybeth Peters The Register of Copyrights before the 
Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate, 108th Cong., 1st Sess. (Sept. 9, 2003). 
279 See, e.g., Database and Collections of Information Misappropriation Act of 2003, 
Statement of David O. Carson General Counsel, United States Copyright Office before 
the Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property Committee on the 
Judiciary and the Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade and Consumer Protection 
Committee on Energy and Commerce, United States House of Representatives, 108th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (Sept. 23, 2003); Sound Recordings as Works Made for Hire, Statement 
of Marybeth Peters The Register of Copyrights before the Subcommittee on Courts and 
Intellectual Property Committee on the Judiciary United States House of Representatives, 
106th Cong., 2nd Sess. (May 25, 2000).  For a list of official statements and reports by 
the Register of Copyright, see http://www.copyright.gov/statements.html. 
280 See Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) Section 104 Report, Statement of 
Marybeth Peters The Register of Copyrights before the Subcommittee on Courts, the 
Internet, and Intellectual Property Committee on the Judiciary United States House of 
Representatives, 107th Cong., 1st Sess. (Dec. 12-13, 2001) (proposing changes). 
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seriously.281 In addition, appointment and confirmation of the Librarian 
of Congress should be subject to the same kinds of considerations as 
appointments of other heads of administrative agencies with substantive 
authority. Additional steps could be taken to ensure a wide representation 
of viewpoints.282 These steps, combined with the unique history of the 
Library of Congress, would help insure some responsiveness to public 
opinion. 
 More generally, the real question is whether Congress would be any 
better. The analysis here must be a comparative institutional analysis,283 
and on that front, giving the Copyright Office additional authority, 
whatever its drawbacks, would be superior to the status quo. The 
alternative to Copyright Office regulation is not no regulation, but 
instead regulation by Congress. As demonstrated above, Congress has 
shown little hesitancy enacting complex, detailed, and industry-specific 
legislation. It has done so with limited expertise, whether economic or 
technical. It has locked these provisions inflexibly into the statute. And it 
has relied heavily upon the industries being regulated. Moreover, public 
access to legislators has, if anything, been even more limited than access 
to the Copyright Office through its rulemaking procedures. Thus, the 
existing course charted by Congress exhibits all of the same flaws, 
without any of the offsetting benefits of expertise and flexibility. 
 Of course, ultimately the course adopted by the Copyright Office 
will reflect the desires of Congress. Thus, if Congress is not committed 
to a more public-regarding copyright policy, it is unrealistic to expect 
that the Copyright Office will be able to serve as a counterweight to that. 
And the potential admittedly exists that Congress could use the 
regulatory process to shield itself even further from accountability. 
However, the argument in this Article is that, at the very least, greater 
involvement by the Copyright Office would reduce some of the potential 
costs of a regulatory approach, by injecting more expertise and more 
flexibility into the legislative process and by providing some more 
centralized and comprehensive nexus for copyright policy. 
 A final objection is that the proposals here would not solve the 
problem of complexity noted at the start of this Article. Rather, the 
proposals would merely shift the complexity from the U.S. Code to the 
Code of Federal Regulations. My response is that reducing complexity is 
not the goal of this Article. In fact, this Article assumes that the trend 
toward ever-increasing complexity is too late to turn back. Rather, this 
                                                                  
281 The activities of the Copyright Office are generally subject to the Administrative 
Procedure Act.  17 U.S.C. § 701(e). 
282 See, e.g., Fisher, PROMISES TO KEEP, supra note 5 Ch. 5 (proposing various 
mechanisms for ensuring greater public accountability). 
283 See Komesar, supra note 72. 
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Article is primarily concerned with the question of how to appropriately 
manage this complexity. And on this score, there seem few attractive 




 Copyright law has become more regulatory, and this trend is here to 
stay. It is therefore important for us to expressly recognize this fact and 
begin to think more carefully about its implications. In particular, we 
need to pay more careful attention to questions of institutional design and 
support for an increasingly complex and detailed regulatory structure. 
The aim of this Article has been to highlight this trend and focus 
increased attention upon it. 
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